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INTRODUCTION 
The proceedings of the conference, PERSPECTIVES ON RISK: A 
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY SYMPOSIUM, consists of eight papers presented 
at the symposium. The papers are divided into three topical sections 
as follows: (1) Biological and Medical Perspectives, (2) Historical and 
Philosophical Perspectives, and (3) Social Science Pe rspectives . 
The paper by Dr. Jere Brittain, "Pesticides: Paradox and Dilemma 
in the Land of Plenty," introduces issues facing agriculture today related 
to the use of pesticides and other chemicals and their consequences. 
Dr . Ron Dillon 's paper · focuses on biological risks and the need for pre­
cision in definitions and research methodologies. In his paper, 
"Epidemiologic Aspects of Risk Assessment Emphasizing Birth Defects," 
Dr . Stanley Schuman, a physician on the staff of the Medical University 
of South Carolina, takes an applied medical perspective of human health 
risks and long-term consequences of current agricultural use of chemicals 
and subsequent health hazards. 
In Section 11, Dr . William Stei rer uses an historical and chronological 
approach to assess the changing technology associated with environmental 
risks . The paper, "Risk Methodology and the Pesticide Dilemma," by 
Dr. Kristin Shrader-Frechette addresses a number of philosophical con­
cerns. She notes that this emerging issue-area needs interdisciplinary 
contributions. She calls for greater precision in definitions and improved 
conceptualization and research methodologies for risk assessment. The 
paper by Dr . Laura Westra , also a philosopher, is primarily an evaluation 
and an extension of the position taken by Shrader-Frechette. 
The third and final section of the proceedings contains psychological 
and sociological perspectives of risk assessment. Dr. Jeffrey Burroughs 
uses non-agricultural examples to illustrate how indiv iduals' behavior is 
influenced by the perception of actual or potential risk in the environ­
ment . Dr. Brenda Vander Mey, a sociologist, combines the contributions 
of demographers, ecologists, historians, economists, and sociologists into 
one essay. The premise of her paper outlines the growing need for 
interdisciplinary cooperation and investigation in this field. 
SECTION I 
BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL PERSPECTIVES 
PESTICIDES: PARADOX AND DILEMMA IN THE LAND OF PLENTY 1 
Jere A. Brittain, Ph.D . 2 
Professor of Horticulture 
Department of Horticulture 
Clemson University 
"Watermelons Contaminated by Pesticides in California ." "Apple 
Industry Threatened by Loss of Chemical." "Nation's Most Widely Used 
Corn and Soybean Herbicide Under Special Review." These media head ­
lines confronted the public in 1985. 
Farmers and consumers are confused and frustrated by a seemingly 
endless stream of questions and challenges about the safety of food, 
water, and air. Are farmers responsible stewards of the land, food, and 
water? Are consumers and the public agencies charged with their pro­
tection setting reasonable standards for farmers whose not-so-silent 
partner is a fickle and unpredictable Mother Nature? What and whom 
should one believe about pesticides and health? What is the role of the 
landgrant university in all of this? The professors at the agricultural 
colleges all receive grants from the pesticide companies, don't they? 
Clemson University, as most landgrant schools, is involved heavily 
in research and educational programs in pest management, includ ing 
pesticides . Unlike most landgrant universities, Clemson is also charged 
with enforcing the South Carolina Pesticide Control Act of 1975. through 
its Division of Regulatory and Public Service Programs, Responsibilities 
under this act include issuance of more than 6,000 pesticide labels per 
year and licensing farmers and others to purchase and use certain re­
stricted pesticides . 
Concerns have been expressed about potential conflicts of interest 
arising from the University ' s research and extension connections with 
farmers and the pesticide industry. Spokesmen for Clemson's Division 
of Regulatory and Public Service Programs contend that the educational 
environment of the university is more conducive to enlightened pesticide 
regulation than the more common state regulatory agency environment . 
South Carolina farmers currently use approximately 10 million pounds 
per year (active ingredient basis) of organic pesticides on five major 
crops . Pesticide use levels in South Carolina have declined since 1975 . 
This is a combined result of new chemicals that are effective at lower 
1 Adapted from a paper, "The Role of the Landgrant University in Pesti­
cide Education, Research and Regulation," presented at Winthrop College, 
1985 . 
2 Coordinator, Integrated Pest Management Program and Agromedicine 
Program, Clemson University. 
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rates and a trend toward prescriptive, rather than preventive, use of 
pesticides. 
Prescriptive use of pesticides has been stimulated by a combination 
of economic pressures (controlling production costs) and promotion of 
integrated pest management ( I PM) practices by state Cooperative Exten­
sion Services. IPM involves combining cultural, biological, and chemical 
pest control tactics based on maximum knowledge of the crop-pest 
ecosystem, with sensitivity to environmental impacts. Many producers 
of cotton, soybeans, tomatoes, peaches, and tobacco routinely hire 
trained observers to systematically "scout" their crops for insects, dis­
eases, and weeds. Pest levels are reported to growers who compare the 
levels to research-based economic damage th res holds. Parasites and 
predators of insect pests are also reported and considered before pre­
scribing a pesticide application. Long-term crop and pest histories are 
recorded for individual fields to aid in predicting future problems. 
Some faculty at landgrant universities are involved in pesticide re­
search; some research is supported by industry grants. Many more 
members of landgrant faculties are involved with cultural and biological 
aspects of pest management. These include biology of the pest, physi­
ology of the host-pest relationship, breeding for pest resistance, 
epidemiology, predators, cropping systems (rotation), pest-crop model­
ing, and pest forecasting. 
The politically active environmental movement of the late '60s and 
the decade of the '70s led to significant federal funding of integrated 
pest management research and Extension programs. With the decline in 
federal funding for these programs in the '80s, a few states (California 
and New York) have provided state support for IPM. At this writing, 
South Carolina has not provided earmarked state funding for IPM pro­
grams. 
The General Assembly of South Carolina has recognized the pesticide 
and human health issue by funding an Agromedicine Center involving the 
Medical University of South Carolina and Clemson University. This center 
makes available medical consultation and collaboration to agricultural re­
search, Extension, and teaching programs as well as to agribusiness. 
An important aspect of the role of the landgrant university in pest 
management education is the absence of "crop doctoring" training 
analagous to that of veterinarians and medical doctors. Farmers must 
diagnose their own crop problems and prescribe their own treatments. 
They obtain somewhat fragmented advice from a combination of county 
Extension agents, pesticide industry representatives, and neighboring 
farmers. A few farmers receive systematic pest management advice from 
independent crop consultants with varying levels of training and expe­
rience. 
Clemson University has proposed to the State Commission on Higher 
Education a new graduate training program in Plant Health. This program 
would provide holistic, interdiscipli nary, professional (non-research) 
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training for students interested in crop-doctoring careers in public 
agencies or industry . Requirements for attaining the degree would in­
clude a comprehensive, boards-type exit examination designed to certify 
competency to diagnose and prescribe remedies for problems of specific 
crops . Currently, most graduate students in agricultural sciences re ­
ceive training designed for research rather than practitioner careers . 
Faculty (Extension and research) at landgrant universities are fre­
quently requested to comment on the benefits side during risk/benefit 
analysis of contested pesticide registrations . In responding to these 
requests, they are faced with a serious dilemma . Should one support 
the continued use of a product with known carcinogenic properties? Is 
it "good science" to extrapolate from responses of sensitive small animal 
strains to large dosages of a chemical to an estimated risk for humans 
during lifetimes of exposure to small dosages? How does this theoretical 
increase in risk relate to other unavoidable risk exposures such as to 
naturally occurring carcinogens in food products and ultraviolet radi­
ation? Here is the pesticide paradox. If human beings are part of na ­
ture, should their chemical inventions necessarily be considered intrusive 
and unnatural? 
Acute toxicology of pesticides can be dealt with in a relatively 
straightforward manner. Low-level chronic toxicology raises issues in 
the fuzzy zone where biological science and technology meet the humani­
ties and social sciences . Historians, philosophers, sociologists, and 
psychologists are becoming increasingly interested and involved in tech­
nology assessment and risk/benefit analysis. Agricultural and biological 
scientists should welcome this involvement. Faculties at landgrant uni­
versities may find in technology assessment a unique catalyst for working 
across disciplinary lines on fuzzy-zone problems important to both farmers 
and consumers. 
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RISK ASSESSMENT FROM A BIOLOGIST'S PERSPECTIVE 
C. Ron Dillon, Ph.D. 
Professor of Botany 
Department of Biological Sciences 
Clemson University 
In developing this paper on risk assessment, I listed five questions 
to which I wanted answers. From the perspective of a research biologist 
who has been involved only peripherally with this subject, they are: 
What is risk assessment? 
What information is needed to make a risk assessment? 
What biological methods are available to assess risks? 
What mathematical methods substantiate the biological findings? 
What are the analytical results and how reliable are they? 
Risk assessment in the world today focuses primarily on cancer and 
carcinogens in humans. Assessment is a complicated and actually 
ascientific or quasi-scientific process in many aspects, as many questions 
need to be answered that cannot be experimentally tested, proved, or 
disproved. Park and Snee 1 have broken out risk assessment as the 
groundwork for risk management. Of the four steps involved in as­
sessment and management, assessment is subdivided into three parts: 
Haza rd identification, hazard evaluation, and risk evaluation. 
To evaluate hazards and estimate assorted risks--and here we mean 
humans--analyses of the following types of studies must be made: 
Mutagen icity 
Acute studies in animals 
Subchronic studies in animals 
Metabolism in animals and humans 
Chronic studies in animals 
Epidemiology 
Route and amount of exposure. 
Boiling these seven topics down amounts to saying that we have two 
ways to assess risk to human health from exposure to toxic agents, the 
first being epidemiological or clinical studies of human populations and 
the second experimental tests on animals or other biological systems. 
Of these, epidemiological studies are often incomplete. It is difficult to 
measure accurately individual exposure patterns, and the control of fac­
tors may modify or confound quantitative measures of health risk. 
Moreover, delays between exposure and occurrence of a measurable effect 
can range up to decades. Plus of course, for new carcinogens, there 
are no human data. 
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Is it then possible to learn about risks to human health by feeding 
huge quantities of diet soft drink to laboratory animals? The answer is 
a somewhat qualified and timorous "yes" or perhaps only "maybe" , if valid 
statistical method is used to extrapolate the data to levels of human in ­
take . 
If one is to extrapolate tests from animals to humans, much care 
must be taken in design and conduct of the studies . Factors that in ­
fluence the results include dosage and frequency of exposure, route of 
administration, species , strain, sex, and age of the animal, and duration 
of the study . 
Experimental data must be based on exposure levels higher than 
those for which human risk estimation is to be made, because at very low 
dose levels extremely large numbers of animals must be used to reduce 
statistical error. (The largest number of animals I've found was in a 
study conducted by National Center for Toxicological Research that used 
24 , 000 mice over 24 months to determine the dose-response of 
2-acetylaminofluorine . Most studies use 100 animals or fewer). Measur­
able effects must come for exposure levels high enough to provide positive 
results; then, because human populations are more often exposed to low 
levels, data must be extrapolated to lower exposure levels. 
Statistical Methods for High-Dose - Low- Dose Extrapolation 
Although extrapolation is often used in science to arrive at an un­
known from the observed, there has developed a family of statistical 
methods that may be used for high-dose - low-dose extrapolation. Six 
of those, listed in order of their ability to estimate potential risk at low 
dose, are as follows: 





Log logistic or logit 
Probit or log normal Lowest 
I make no claim to being a statistician or mathematician; however, 
like most in biological sciences, I do use cookbook statistical programs 
to show "goodness of fit" or statistical reliability and so on. From that 
standpoint, it has been interesting to try to understand the difference 
in these models for use in estimating risk and to try to understand why 
one of them will not suffice. For most of the information that follows, 




The One-Hit Model 
The one-hit model assumes that for any given age, the probability 
of a tumor is directly proportional to the amount of exposure. This can 
result from the assumption that only one critical molecular event between 
a target site and the proximate carcinogen is sufficient to result in a 
tumor, and the probability of such an interaction is directly proportional 
to the nominal concentration of the carcinogen. 
The model assumes a dose-response that is approximately linear at 
low doses. As commonly used, the model ignores the toxicological reality 
of nonlinear dose-response mechanisms, saturation kinetics, no-effect 
levels or th res holds of a real or practical nature . 
The model does estimate an upper limit on the potential risk and 
may be useful in situations where an upper bound is of interest. For 
example, if the potential risk calculated by the one-hit model is not un­
acceptable, then there wou Id be less need to consider other models. On 
the other hand, if permissible exposures predicted by the one-hit model 
are unrealistically low, which is often the case, then further risk analyses 
would have to be made to confirm or refute the one-hit model results. 
In all cases it must be kept in mind that potential risks predicted by the 
one-hit model may be several orders of magnitude more than the true 
potential risk. 
The Multi-Stage Model 
Biological justification for this model is that cancer is believed to 
be a multi-stage process that can be approximated by a series of multi­
plicative linear functions. For instance, the concentration of the 
proximate carcinogen at the target site can be modeled by a series of 
kinetic reactions that are usually assumed to be linear at low doses but 
may be non-linear at high doses. Concentration kinetics may also be 
linear at low doses. No proportional response is implied because at some 
concentration the existence of defense and repair systems is likely to 
modulate the response. 
Generally, this model fits well in the observable or experimental dose 
range, but it has very limited applicability to the estimation of potential 
risk at low doses. Limitations arise, first, because the model cannot 
reflect low dose changes in kinetics, metabolism, and mechanisms and, 
second, because low-dose estimates are highly sensitive to a change of 
even a few observed tumors at the lowest experimental dose. 
The statistical approach to account for the random variation in tumor 
frequencies is to express the results in terms of measures of uncertainty. 
There is then a "Linearized Multi-Stage Model," the math and statistical 
manipulations of which I won't try to cover, but will only say that the 
dose response predicted by this model results in estimates of potential 
risk that are almost identical to those of the one-hit model; and for almost 
8 
all applications there is no appreciable difference between the linear model 
and the linearized multi-stage model. 
Multi-Hit Model 
The "hit theory" for interaction between radiation particles and 
susceptible biologic targets has generated a general class of models which 
includes the "One-Hit Model" already discussed and the "Multi-Hit Model." 
The theory rests on several postulates, such as the following: 
An organism has a certain number of "critical targets." 
The organism responds when some of these targets are destroyed . 
The target is destroyed if hit by so many toxic particles. 
The probability of a hit is proportional to the dose level. 
The multi-hit model assumes that some specific or approximate 
number of molecular interactions are necessary to induce the formation 
of a tumor, and the distribution of these molecular events over time is 
randomly distributed or follows a Poisson series. The model appears to 
fit some data fairly well and to give low-dose predictions that are similar 
to other models. However, there are other cases where predicted values 
may vary from other models by several orders of magnitude, and where 
VIRTUALLY SAFE DOSE may be, obviously, either too high or too low. 
All of the foregoing are models derived from "mechanistic" assump­
tions; this means that something must affect something, and all tend to 
provide a linear dose-response curve. Essentially the implication is that 
the greater the dose the greater the response, or the greater the pro­
portion of responses to be expected and vice versa. As stated above, 
they also tend to provide the higher estimates of potential risk. 
The last three models in the list are tolerance distribution models. 
Under constant environmental conditions, one commonly assumes that 
there is a certain dose level below which the particular subject will not 
respond in a specified manner and above which the subject will respond 
with certainty. This level is referred to as the subject's tolerance. 
Because individuals within a population lack genetic homogeneity, their 
tolerance levels vary. These models consider the frequency distribution 
of cumulative tolerances over the population, and the sigmoid curves 
resulting from plotting proportion responding to dose level can be thought 
of as representing the dose response either for the population as a whole 
or for a randomly selected individual. 
The Probit or Log Normal Model 
This model was originally proposed for use in problems in biological 
assay, i.e., the assessment of the potency of toxicants, drugs, and other 
biological stimuli, and has been primarily used for problems of dose­
response interpolation (estimation within the range of observable response 
rates) rather than dose-response extrapolation (estimation outside the 
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range of observable rates). The model has been modified 4 for extrapo­
lation of expected low-dose response from experimentally induced effects 
observed at high dose. The modification made was to arbitrarily establish 
a conservatively shallower slope than that predicted from the plot of the 
experimental study. The arbitrary slope is not meant to represent the 
"true" slope in the low-dose region, but rather a conservatively shallow 
slope no matter what the true dose response may be in this region. The 
modified model does not provide a necessarily valid estimate of low-dose 
risk, but rather provides a conservative estimate of risk. 
The Log-Logistical Model or Logit 
This model, which was derived from chemical kinetic theory, is 
similar to probit in that the projected cumulative response curve is 
sigmoid and symmetrical around the 50 percent response level, but ap­
proaches the 0- and 100-percent response levels more slowly than does 
probit. It is said that probit and logit functions are so similar in ap­
pearance that discrimination between them is nearly impossible. 
The Weibull Model 
This model is based on a 1951 theory by Fisher and Holloman 5 that 
carcinogenesis is a multi-cell rather than a single-cell phenomenon. As 
such, this model has many of the dose- response extrapolation character­
istics of the multi-hit model. 
There are other models that we could discuss. Among them are the 
pharmacokinetic models, which are often based on Michaelis-Mento'n ex­
pressions, and which assume that biological effects are manifestations of 
biochemical interactions between foreign substances and components of 
the body. Actual mechanisms of toxicity are many and varied, and the 
kinetics that relate the concentration and exposure duration of a toxic 
substance, with its effect at its site of action, depends upon the type 
of mechanism or mode of action of the toxin. 
At this point you might begin to wonder at the number of models 
that may be used in risk assessment and how to pick the proper one for 
some application. Bear in mind that all of these, at least the mechanistic 
and the dose-tolerance models, tend to provide generally agreeable re­




COMPARISON OF DOSE-RESPONSE RELATIONSHIPS OVER 
A RANGE OF OBSERVABLE RESPONSE RATES 
Percent Responders 
Dose level Log normal Legit 1- hit Multi - hit Weibull Multi - stage 
4 84 84 94 99 99 100 
2 69 70 75 85 85 85 
1 50 50 50 50 49 46 
.5 31 30 29 21 21 21 
. 25 16 16 16 7 8 9 
The differences seen here are often not statistically significant o 
However , compare the next table: 
TABLE 2 
EXTRAPOLATION OF DOSE - RESPONSE RELATIONSHIPS TO LOW 
DOSE LEVELS 
Percent Responders 
Dose level Log normal Logit 1- hit Multi-hit Weibull Multi-stage 
. 01 .005 .4 . 7 .014 . 067 .3 
. 001 . 00035 .026 .07 .00014 . 0021 . 03 
. 0001 1X 10-7 . 0016 .007 1.5x10-5 6 . 7x10-5 . 003 
Note that the models are indeed similar to each other in the range 
of observable response rates, yet differ in the region of primary interest , 
the lower , unobservable response rates. Charles Brown 6 states : "This 
is the single most important limitation of extrapolation methodology . An 
estimate of risk at a particular low dose, or an estimate of the dose 
leading to a prespecific level of risk, is highly dependent upon the 
mathematical form of the presumed dose-response; differences of 3 - 4 or­
ders of magnitude are not uncommon. The proposal of "new" models, 
unless based upon strong mechanistic information, will not alleviate the 
difficulties . .. . The contribution from statist icians and model-builders has 
reached an impasse, and more accurate extrapolations are not possible 
without additional information on the mechanisms of action of the toxic 
agents . " 
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Further, from Park and Snee, "Extrapolations of tumorigenic re­
sponses to very low doses by means of mathematical models are of limited 
value because the models can have no validated biological basis since 
these are not known for any carcinogen. Certainly, any extrapolations 
should be made with great care and only in conjunction with a variety 
of supporting data. To do otherwise amounts to nothing more than a 
blind curve fitting exercise with little predictive value.... It is unlikely 
that the regulatory decision process will be even largely quantified by a 
single model, or group of models, in the near future. " 7 
The question then arises as to how you decide which model to use 
when trying to predict low-dose response. I do not have a definitive 
answer and at present apparently none exists. The only answer seems 
to be use them all, and then make an arbitrary decision (read that "ed­
ucated guess") as to which should govern based on available knowledge. 
That necessity plus the requirement that other questions must be ad­
dressed (see those appended), none of which can be answered with an­
ything approaching scientific certainty, prompted my earlier remark that 
much of risk assessment is indeed ascientific. 
This presentation wou Id seem to have deviated from the topic of 
"Biological Aspects of Risk Assessment;" but in fact the statistical in­
terpretation of biological data is an integral part of biological research, 
and the two will always be intertwined. 
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Appendix 
QUESTIONS THAT AN ASSESSOR CONCERNED WITH A CARCINOGEN 
MUST EXAMINE, BUT WHICH CANNOT BE ANSWERED WITH SCIENTIFIC 
CERTAINTY 6 
Is finding excess tumor production in experimental animals sufficient to 
conclude that a substance will display carcinogenic properties in humans? 
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3 
Which of several different sets of experimental animal data is most ap­
propriate for estimating human risk? 
Which sets of tumor data should be used for high to low dose extrapo­
lation? 
Which mathematical models of the dose-response curve should be used to 
estimate low-dose risk? 
Which measure of dose should be used for interspecies extrapolation? 
How should differences in frequency, timing, and duration of exposure 
be taken into account when extrapolating experimental observations to 
human populations? 
How should magnitude, frequency, and duration of human exposure be 
estimated if only limited data are available (as is usually the case)? 
How should various exposed populations be stratified for purposes of 
assigning risks? 
How shou Id final risk estimates be expressed? 
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THE "MIRAGE OF HEALTH": 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC ASPECTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
EMPHASIZING BIRTH DEFECTS 
Stanley H. Schuman, M.D., Dr.P.H. 
Medical Di rector 
Agromedicine Program 
Clemson University and the 
Medical University of South Carolina 
Concern for human health has lead to increasing efforts to assess 
the evidence for and against causation by pesticides. The sciences 
contributing to the evidence are: analytical chemistry, environmental 
studies, experimental toxicology in vivo and in vitro, clinical poisonings, 
biostatistics, and epidemiology. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF PRESUMED HEAL TH EFFECTS 
Epidemiology (as the basic science of preventive medicine) tries to 
assess the short-term and long-term health effects in human populations 
of exposure to a suspect risk factor (toxin, occupation, diet, etc.). 
Despite over 40 years of experience with several generations of pesti­
cides, little evidence for toxic effects beyond acute clinical poisoning can 
be linked to pesticides (Table 1). Listed in Table 2 are seven categories 
of possible health effects. Category (A) reflects acute clinical poisonings 
that occur under conditions of accidental exposure to high concentrations 
of a pesticide or mix tu res of pesticides. These incidents lead to re­
strictions on use, warning labels, and strict handling practices in man­
ufacture and agriculture. The other health effects (B - F) are legitimate 
concerns for any suspect exposure to any of the chemical classes of 
pesticides, but relatively little is known. In order to detect a linkage 
between one type of rare cancer and one type of pesticide exposure, a 
recent study required 333 cancer cases and 1000 control subjects. Over 
three years of meticulous interviews and data analysis were required to 
discover this important but limited relationship (11% excess risk). 
Extrapolation 
Unfortunately, delayed or indirect health effects based on smaller 
doses over an extended period of time, are now being estimated by ex­
trapolation from partial data or animal models. 1 Extrapolation of human 
health effects from data on high doses over short-time periods given to 
small animals requires attention to detail, experimental judgment, and 
mathematical models of lifetime exposure th rough ingestion of food and 
water, inhalation of air, or skin contact and exposure. Scientists are 
being asked to extend their judgment beyond the data to arrive at the 
"most prudent" recommendation, a "ball-park figure," or an estimate of 
"potential for harm" for the regulatory agencies. In fact, these ex­
trapolations have led to the use of the terms "the new toxicology" and 
"regulatory science" by Efron. 2 The limits of experimental toxicology 
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(what is the most appropriate test species or strain of animal?) and the 
mathematical models (thresholds for dose-response curves) place special 
weight on the findings from human studies involving epidemiology. 
TABLE 1 
TRENDS IN INSECTICIDES 
- Arsenicals (Paris Green) 
- Organochlorines · (DDT) 
- Organophosphates (Parathion) 
- Carbamates (Carbary!) 
- Bacterial (Bacillus Thuringiensis) 
- Synthetic Pyrethroid (Permethrin); Hormone ( ProDrone) 
Research = New Products 
TABLE 2 
SO-CALLED HEALTH EFFECTS OF PESTICIDES 
A. Acute (Intoxication) 
B. Subacute ( Delayed) 
C. Chronic (Cancer) 
D. Reproductive (Fertility, Birth Defects) 
E. Allergy (Hypersensitivity) 
F. Psychological (Condit ioned Response) 
The Natural History of Birth Defects 
For purposes of this interdisciplinary symposium, I would like to 
select birth defects as an example of epidemiology contributing important 
new information on the possible teratogenic effects of pesticides. 
Successful birthing begins with a healthy ovum and healthy sperm 
and ends with uncomplicated delivery. The first 2 to 8 weeks of fetal 
deve lopment is especially susceptible to damage. Birth defects are man­
ifest in at least 161 clinical categories, singly and in combination,ranging 
from minor malformations to major Iife-th reatening defects. Overall, two 
to three percent of infants (live and stillborn) have one or more defects. 
Dr . J. Warkany reminds us that nature eliminates abnormal ova and 
embryos (spontaneous abortion). 3 Otherwise "the frequency of birth 
defects would be 12 percent instead of 2 to 3." 
15 
"Even today only about 10 percent of human malformations can be 
ascribed to environmental factors. " 4 (These factors include viruses, 
parasites, drug therapy for cancer, epilepsy and diabetes, bacteria, 
irradiation, and exposure of mother and father to chemicals). An addi­
tional 25 percent of malformations can be blamed on genetic or ch romo­
somal mechanisms (including consanguinity). The majority of birth 
defects - 65 percent - are as yet unexplained as to causation. The 
science of human birth defects (teratology) has a long way to go. 
Marionfeld reminds us that when it comes to birth defects, 
veterinary medicine and human medicine are not too different . 5 In 
Missouri during the 60's, he monitored human and swine birth defects 
on a statewide basis. Defects of the central nervous system (brain and 
spine) were the same proportion (14%) of all birth defects; the other 
organ system defects were quite similar between 1.6 million human births 
and 5 . 1 million swine births. Fortunately no new chemical hazards were 
detected in the detailed Missouri studies of human and swine reprod­
uction. In another study, a cyclops (one-eye) deformity in lambs was 
traced to toxic effects of the pregnant sheep grazing on veratrum 
californicum, a naturally occuring toxin. 6 
This background of naturally occurring birth defects occurs in ev­
ery country regardless of latitude or longitude, urbanization, or indus­
trialization. It is difficult, but not impossible, to detect a new cause 
or increase in specified human birth defects. The tools are clinical di­
agnosis and standardized monitoring. A successful example was the early 
recognition of phocomelia (limb-reduction deformity) resulting from 
pregnant women taking thalidomide during 1959-1961. 7 Dramatic as this 
epidemic was, the deformity itself was recognized sporadically in Europe 
before the epidemic as well as in ancient times. (See Figure 1 on next 
page) 8 Contrary to popular belief, phocomelia deformity is not unique 
to the man-made drug, thalidomide, but is the expression of some insult 
to the fetus at a critical stage of development. 
Epidemiologic Studies of Birth Defects 
Currently the government is conducting several massive studies of 
U.S. servicemen who experienced exposure to dioxin contaminants of the 
herbicide, 2,4,5-T (Agent Orange) used as a defoliant in Viet Nam. So 
far, the data do not show an increase in birth defects, stillbirths, or 
sterility in exposed veterans compared to (control) nonexposed 
veterans. 9 Nevertheless, in parallel to the veterans ' concern, there has 
been a growing civilian concern over the past two decades of the growing 
use of pesticides in general and herbicides in particular. 10 Over 50 
percent of the pesticides used in S. C. last year were in the herbicide 
category. 
The suspension of Silvex by EPA was argued on the basis of a 
cluster of miscarriages among several women in Alsea, Oregon, in 1980 
and a followup epidemiologic study. Unfortunately, the EPA study was 
flawed both in design and interpretation. The findings were later dis­
credited by international review by scientific peers. Thus, the birth 
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Figure 1 
An example of limb reduction defect 
(phocomelia) from a medical textbook 
published in 1891. This predates any 
of the epidemic of thalidomide induced 
phocomelia birth defects seventy years 





Skeleton of a phocomclw~. (l\lusl'.~c Dupuytren.) 
17 
defects of dioxins produced in animals were not confirmed in Oregon. 
The discrepancy between potential and actual fetotoxicity was not de­
tected until after the legal restrictive action was ta ken. Needless to say, 
the Silvex ban remains in effect. 11 
Another example is the study of delayed health effects of exposure 
to the residents of the toxic waste dump site of Love Canal, New York . 
Although subjective reports suggested an excess percentage of birth 
defects, the only objective finding from the highest exposure area within 
the Love Canal subdivision was a statistical reduction in birth weight. 
This is of the same order found to be associated with smoking during 
pregnancy. 12 Careful chromosome aberation studies in the blood of ex­
posed cases and controls revealed no differences. 13 
Occupational Exposure 
What new information from epidemiologic monitoring of U.S. birth 
defects is available to shed light on the potential or actual reproductive 
harm resulting from sustained high use of agricultural herbicides? A 
study of 314 agricultural aviation pilots and 150 controls (nonpilot male 
siblings) was conducted to detect any reproductive health effects. Most 
pilots had over 15 years of occupational exposure to concentrated doses 
of pesticides. There was no evidence of reproductive damage. This was 
reassuring to the participants. 14 Unfortunately, human reproduction 
studies of occupational exposure have at least two limitations: poor 
quantitation of exposure and relatively small numbers of conceptions. 
One hesitates to generalize from specialized agriculture pilots to the 
general population at risk. 
International Surveillance of Birth Defects 
Fortunately, the U. S. and 23 other countries have developed large 
scale ongoing monitoring systems (birth registries and hospital records) 
since 1970 to overcome the limitations of small numbers and other biases 
(errors in memory, over-or-under reporting). These are designed as 
an early warning system to prevent another epidemic of birth defects such 
as those caused by rubella virus or thalidomide. 15 
In a recent report ( 1985) Edmonds and James show trends for major 
birth defects from 13 years of records (1970-1983) covering 13.0 million 
births (live and stillborn), including over 20 percent of the U.S . hospital 
deliveries. 1 6 
Of the 33 major defects, the good news is that the trends for 17 
defects are stable, 5 major defects are now decreasing, and only 11 de­
fects show a statistically significant increase. Typical of the stable group 
are Down Syndrome (Figure 2), club foot (Figure 3), and cleft lip with 
or without cleft palate (Figure 4). (See Figures 2-5 on the following 
pages.) These are three major causes of infant damage, accounting for 
over one-fourth of the major birth defects. Also, they are easily detected 
at birth and do not require sophisticated medical technology for diagno­
sis . 
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Typical of the increased group of birth defects is ventricular septa I 
defect (Figure !:>). This is one of the five cardiovascular anomalies 
showing a statistically significant rise over recent years. These account 
for less than one-fourth of the total major birth defects. Authors of the 
report at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta and experts 
in other countries (Ireland, Hungary, Canada, Australia) point out that 
this apparent rise in U.S. cardiovascular birth defects reflects better 
· reporting in the U.S. Recent advances in diagnostic techniques of 
cardiology, especially in the northeastern section of the U.S . , have in­
creased the number of cardiovascular defects rather than some new 
etiologic agent at work in the environment. 17 
The remaining six birth defects of the increased group include 
congenital cataract, congenital hip dislocation, autosomal abnormality ex­
cluding Down Syndrome and three G. U. anomalies (hypospadias, renal 
agenesis, and urethral obstruction). Except for renal agenesis, all are 
probably due to better diagnosis. 
Typical of the decrease group of birth defects are two very signif­
icant categories: anencephaly (Figure 6) and spina bifida (Figure 7) 
(See Figures on the following pages.) These neural tube defects in the 
embryo represent a critical stage in development of the normal fetus. 
They are readily diagnosed at birth without use of sophisticated medical 
technology. Among all birth defects this nervous system category has 
been documented to reflect environmental damage to the embryo, whether 
human or animal. These fetotoxins include radiation, chemotherapy, 
cancer and epileptic drugs, and a variety of natural and synthetic toxins. 
History indicates factors such as the devastating potato blight in 
Ireland in 1845-1849, caused by the fungus (Phytophthora infestans). 18 
19 An epidemic of neural tube defects occurred in Boston and . Rhode 
Island in 1929-1932, presumably triggered by exposure to toxicants in 
21 22illegal booze or to changes in potato species and storage. 20 
Like phocomelia, anencephaly and spina bifida were recognized in 
ancient times. Many major birth defects are found in Egyptian mummies 
and in ancient drawings and figurines; this suggests the possible role 
of natural toxins, trace elements, or nutritional deficiencies long before 
the industrial revolution. 
Evidence from the United States and Hungary 
The good news is that there is growing evidence that the much 
feared "epidemic" of herbicide-triggered birth defects due to the alleged 
environmental pollution of air, water, food, and soil has not yet occurred . 
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The clinical epidemiology importance of this negative finding is that, 
despite alleged or real errors in herbicide use, contaminants, handling, 
spills, and residues that may have occurred in the past ten years in the 
U . S., the most clearcut environmentally triggered and feared birth defect 
has not occurred. The incubation period for human birth defects is at 
most nine months from conception to delivery. Over a 13-year period 
there are a succession of 9-month experiments (over 17 gestation periods) 
to test the hypothesis of herbicide-birth defects resulting from herbicide 
exposure . The U.S. birth-monitoring system did not exist before 1970. 
Independent confirmation of U.S. data comes from Hungary- -where 
100 percent population based registry of births documents a decline in 
stillbirths, a decline in anencephaly, and no increase in Down Syndrome, 
cleft lip and palate, in the face of almost 10 years of increasing use of 
2,4,5-T in Hungarian agriculture representing 40 percent of the country's 
labor force (Figure 8). 2 3 In neither Eu rope nor the U.S. are the declines 
attributable to prenatal diagnosis or elective abortion. 24 
Birth Defects and Cancer: Teratogens and Carcinogens 
The reasons for emphasizing birth defects for this symposium are 
threefold: 
I . Cancers from pesticides will require many years for incubation 
time to elapse (1-3 decades) and for discriminant analysis from other 
carcinogens, including the aging process, heredity, diet, occupa­
tion, use of tobacco and alcohol, exposure to coal tars, etc. Nev­
ertheless, evidence for any carcinogenic pesticide effect must be 
monitored; the data will be controversial and inconclusive for some 
time to come. By contrast, the birth defect data are relatively 
unbiased, standardized, and presently available for analysis. 
11. Birth defects resulting from environmental damage (radiation, 
ultra-violet light, drugs, toxins) are biolog ically linked to certain 
cancers. Neel refers to this linkage as the "carcinogen-mutagen 
axis" . 25• Childhood cancers and birth defects have been linked to 
an underlying process of damage to essential cellular genetic 
material. 26 For example, diethyl stilbestrol (DES) given to pregnant 
mothers to prevent abortion resulted in both birth defects and 
vaginal cancer in the offspring. Another example is leukemia, which 
is at least eleven times higher in Down Syndrome than in normal 
children. Ill. In response to the Public Health Service's objective 
report of essentially good news (decreases of birth defects especially 
in the category of RH hemolytic defects) , the media ( radio and 
television) chose to emphasize the "bad news" (the increase in 
cardiac defects which is probably not a true increase at all). 27 
20 
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U.S. Trends for 
Down Syndrome, 
1970-1983 
(rates per 10,000 total births) 
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Figure 3 
U.S. Trends for 
Clubfoot with/without 
Anomalies of the 
Central Nervous System, 
1970-1983 
(rates per 10,000 total births) 
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Figure 4 
U. S. Trends for 
Cleft Lip with/without 
Cleft Palate, 
1970-1983 
(rates per 10,000 total births) 
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U.S. Trends for 
Ventricular Septal Defect 
1970-1983 
(rates per 10,000 total births) 
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Figure 6 
U. S. Trends for 
Anencephaly, 
1970-1983 
(rates per 10,000 total births) 
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U.S. Trends for 
Spina Bifida, 
1970-1983 
(rates per 10,000 total births) 
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* USAGE OF 2,4,5-T, STILLBIRTHS AND 
SELECTED BIRTH DEFECT RATES IN HUNGARY, (21) 
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Why would the media underreport the "good" news and overreport 
the inconclusive "bad" news? One can only speculate on: (a) the failure 
of communication between reporter and experts (b) the attempt to satisfy 
a presumed public appetite for a new health scare, (c) a climate of health 
consciousness in the U.S. today bordering upon mass hypochondriasis 
(Table 3), 28 and (d) a high level of public distrust of scientists, gov­
ernment and industry whenever health or environmental issues are con­
cerned. 
As an epidemiologist, I have reason for hope. I agree with Harry 
S . Truman who wrote ... "My confidence in evolution of man ' s works. 
I have never seen pessimists make anything work or contribute anything 
of lasting value. It takes idealists to make the world work. " 32 In terms 
of birth defects and public attitudes, at least three misconceptions are 
at work: 
(1) The natural history of birth defects as a background occurrence 
(two major defects and one minor defect per 100 births) is not un­
derstood. Expectations exceed reality. There is a "Mirage of 
Health" described by Dubos in 1959 in Table 4. The public expects 
every pregnancy to be planned and every conception to result in a 
"perfect baby" (Table 5). 
TABLE 3 
HEAL TH CONCERNS IN THE UNITED STATES 
APPROPRIATE OR NOT? 
FACT: Health expenditures have doubled as percent of Gross 
National Product from 1960 (5 .3%) to 1983 (10.8%). 
FACT : A 1984 three-community survey in Louisiana revealed 
that 1 of 3 adults scored clinically high on an index 
for hypochondriasis (overconcern with one's health). 27 
28 
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SECTION II 
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
RISK ASSESSMENT AND PESTICIDES : A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
William F. Steirer, Jr., Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of History 
Department of History 
Clemson University 
For a historian to participate in a symposium on risk assessment 
pertaining to agricultural pesticides is unusual, as historians have dis­
played little interest in the subject of risk assessment in general, much 
less as it pertains to something as specific as pesticides. In my own case, 
I owe the invitation to participate primarily to my ties to the Kellogg grant 
committee at Clemson, the sponsors of this symposium. But with histo­
rians showing so little interest in the subject it will not be difficult to 
offer a historical perspective both distinctive and challenging. 
Philosopher Kristen Shrader-Frechette pleads in Science Policy, 
Ethics, and Economic Methodology: Some Problems of Technological As­
sessment and Environmental-Impact Analysis for a greater inclusion of 
ethical comments in technological assessment, and, accordingly, calls for 
the inclusion of philosophy along with the usual disciplines of sociology, 
chemistry, political science, and economics. She, apparently, also de­
liberately excludes history from such a team. 1 And I am aware that the 
lineup of speakers advancing disciplinary prospectives at this symposium 
progresses hierarchially from those with "hard" perspectives on technol­
ogy to those with one so "soft" that it barely exists and that the focus 
at the symposium comes from a presentist assumpt ion that is alien to 
historians. 
Technological assessment in formal terms is such a new proposition, 
dating as it does back only to 1966, that those who early saw the pos­
sibilities present in devising a new way of looking at technologies that 
would turn technology from being an independent element in the process 
of social change into a dependent determinant within that process should 
hardly be blamed for efforts to maintain an air of mystery about the 
process. Technological assessment is the "thorough and balanced analysis 
of all significant primary, secondary, indirect, and delayed consequences 
of society, the environment or the economy. " 2 Risk assessment must be 
thought of as a way of emphasizing that the central element in techno­
logical assessment is the balancing of benefits and hazards in a subjec­
tive, qualitative way. Risk assessment is, therefore, just another way 
of describing technological assessment, but with the difference that em­
phasis is placed on "risk" being assessed rather than on "technology," 
and the discussion centers on people instead of technology. 
Certainly, historians, once they penetrate the clouds of mystery that 
swirl about technological assessment, will find that a knowledge of a 
particular technology is not as essential in adequately assessing the ef­
fects of that technology upon society as is the understanding of the na­
ture of the human experiences that they bring to the task. Where the 
other disciplines represented at their symposium either feature a way of 
predicting future patterns or feature a sense of the "ought" in human 
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experience as part of their respective methodologies, historians offer 
neither. Instead, historians possess an inherent disciplinary humility 
that comes from their knowledge that they can neither predict future 
patterns nor offer a set of "oughts" as guides to human behavior. Part 
of that humility comes from a methodological refusal to moralize about past 
human beings, to find instead the answers to "how" and "why" men acted 
in particular ways. The best among historians evaluate and judge but 
do not see their function as being "hanging judges." 
As a result, historians possess a deep-seated susp1c1on of those who 
would predict the actions that men will take in the future because as 
historians they know full well that the past motivations and behavior of 
human beings continually demonstrate how unpredictable human beings 
have been and the rather haphazard effect that "oughts" have in human 
affairs. So historians, believing, wrongly I might add, that technological 
assessment and risk assessment are cleverly disguised attempts to predict 
the future paths of human beings, have remained uninterested in the 
process. And, in turn, those charged with developing methods of as­
sessing risks and technology have been uninterested in possible con­
tributions by historians. 
The challenge of persuading historians to recognize technological 
assessment and risk assessment for the useful processes that they are 
does not seem particularly formidable. They must simply be disabused 
of their thinking that predicting future actions is involved, and recognize 
that the process of risk assessment entails establishing priorities, setting 
criteria, and accumulating data in an integrated package so that society 
can determine if the potential "good" in the technology outweighs the 
potential "evil" and what to do about the technology in either case. 
That task is easier than persuading those who have staked out claims 
to expertise in risk assessment procedures that a historical perspective 
not only would be helpful but also even essential to creating a proper 
approach to assessing risks in technology. Why is this so? In our 
presentist-minded world, historians are often looked upon, fondly, but 
nonetheless firmly, as anachronisms with little to offer in solving today's 
problems. "What good is history anyway" is the challenging question 
often asked by people in all parts of society. And to many nonhistorians, 
it is purely a rhetorical question needing no answer. 
But answers are available. For one thing, a historical perspective 
can provide a sense of what the accretion of tech no logy has meant in our 
society. More scientists are alive today than the total of all those who 
lived previously in the world's history. The same can be said for engi­
neers and technicians. This adds up to a realization that the rate of 
change induced by technology has increased exponentially in the past two 
generations with every prospect of an even more rapid increase in the 
future. 
Furthermore, historians, I would argue, understand better than 
scientists, engineers, or social scientists how people have handled those 
changes in the past, what risks they have been prepared to take, and, 
especially, what has been at specific points in the past the domino 
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effect -- the connections - -brought on by the accumulated advances in 
technology . Historians can bring to the assessment process the ability 
to isolate factors from both their temporal and spatial contexts and to 
study what effect those factors had in generating later factors. It is 
what Kenneth Burke claimed to be doing in the television series, "Con­
nections . " In it Burke traced the relationships of one set of factors with 
another set however unrelated they look to be on a superficial level. It 
is the acknowledgment that the relationships that exist in human society 
among people, things, institutions, and beliefs are multi-faceted and 
layers deep, and it is the understanding about what might be done with 
the knowledge gained about those relationships that historians offer to 
assessment teams . 
As a matter of fact, historians do risk assessment as part of their 
scholarly routine. The historians' attempts to sort out the past is in 
large part the effort to learn how people have evaluated and assessed 
the potential (and real) risks that were confronted in the past. What 
prompted people in the past to make the moves that they did? Can our 
knowledge, if we can accumulate in sufficient amounts, help us under­
stand how people may respond in the future to technological innovations? 
Can we apply what we know about past risk assessments to the present? 
Historians believe that the answer to all these questions is--yes! 
In dealing with people ' s motivations, they come to understand how com­
plex are those motivations. Historians assume that human beings are 
rational beings until they prove by their behavior that they are not . 
It is clear that, in acting rationally, people can and do naturally balance 
the risks and benefits present in any situation in a subjective, qualitative 
way . They can do so because they have the ability to learn the differ­
ences between right and wrong and knowing the differences can poten­
tially choose right over wrong. 
Furthermore, as already stated, historians are fully aware of the 
old cliche that "the road to hell is paved with good intentions." They 
have observed how many people have moved down that road. History 
consists, after all, of the written record of humanity's actions on this 
earth, failures as well as successes, wrong choices as well as right ones . 
As Adam and Eve demonstrated during the first chance that humans had 
to assess the risk present in a situation, the choice came down on the 
wrong side. 
But, since looking at the Bible for confirmation may not be appro­
priate for everyone, let's look at the earliest history of agriculture. 
How did those early humans learn which plants to ennoble, which were 
not dangerous? How did they learn which plants could be made to grow 
in a reasonably well-controlled ecosystem? Which plants were edible? 
Which plants, harmless, if not exactly primitive and surely lacking in 
page after page of mathematical equations and formulas, was necessary? 
That process deserves to be called risk assessment, for is not that what 
they were doing? The number of times that wrong choices were made, 
risks mistakenly assessed, undoubtedly was frequent and the conse­
quences severe. 
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As historians we try to recreate the situation, look at it from the 
perspective of the actors, ask the same questions they asked (if we can), 
see what answers they arrived at. In this way we come to know how they 
identified what risks they faced. We come to understand that, however 
urgently they sought to recognize what would be the consequences of 
their actions, the time frame of the individuals or groups of individuals 
involved is both all that counts and counts for nothing. 
Risk is a people problem - it is people who fear the loss of life, 
injury, and the unknown. The people who fear the risks that are po­
tentially present in technology - in this case, pesticides - are people like 
us and like those who love us. We cannot impersonalize the process of 
risk assessment without our work becoming a meaningless intellectual 
exercise. And so in dealing with the contemporary scene, we all too often 
find ourselves in a "catch 22" situation. Our personal involvement makes 
it impossible to interpret the material critically to place it in a broader 
context. Historians, by using the perspective of time, can describe some 
of the pitfalls and opportunities that exist in risk management, which 
otherwise our intimate involvement in the world keeps us from examining. 
The task that historians would perform in assessing the risks po­
tentially present in any pesticide available for use in our society is to 
provide an objective framework in which past experiences can operate. 
Historians know that people do learn from the past, but only what they 
want to learn from that past; the rest they discard. Historians can help 
with this dynamic because they understand it. 
One of those matters that historians have learned from the past is 
how much life is risk and how our stay on this earth is inseparable from 
life and existence. Humans are doomed to live with a high level of un­
certainty - a level that, to me at any rate, does not seem much lessened 
in spite of our increasingly formalized ways of trying to fathom what lies 
ahead. Life and risk are synonymous terms, so much so that the question 
we really face about pesticides and risk is not whether there shall be 
risk involved, but how much risk we will tolerate. We should not talk 
about yes or no, but rather about how much or how far. 
Finally, it seems to me that historians, versed in the knowledge of 
the limitations revealed by human beings in the past, can act as the brake 
upon humans' overarching desire to master all and to bend all creation 
to humans' will. Let us develop a sound procedure where risks can be 
assessed - let us manage risks but do so always within a framework that 
recognizes our limitations and the limitations of available technology. A 
brief look at two case studies will help me show what I mean. 
In the period, 1947-74, the agricultural use of pesticides increased 
ten-fold. In the same period that saw such a dramatic rise in pesticide 
use, the rate of crop loss rose by a factor of two. In America, although 
acreage treated for pests rose from 1 to 52 percent, crop losses of corn 
have increased almost four-fold. The natural ecosystem, has been de­
stroyed by the widespread use of pesticides with the result being to bind 
agriculturalists to a policy that brings neither immediate nor long-term 
advantages. 3 
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A similar situation can be observed in the case of the spruce 
budworm. Before people interfered in the natural process, the ecological 
system of which the budworm was a part could have served as a superb 
example of how an eco-system should work . Normally rare, the spruce 
budworm breaks out in large numbers every 30 years or so. The 
infestation then becomes so great that a large proportion of the older 
forest is defoliated and killed. This eliminates much of the insect's 
habitat so that it returns to being a rare pest during the period that a 
vigorous young forest grows back . 4 
Unfortunately, commercial lumbering is difficult under these condi­
tions; so in the 1950's, when an eruption took place, pesticides were 
applied liberally. This meant that forests remained in a native state, the 
very habitat in which the spruce budworm th rived. The budworm pop­
ulation has, therefore, been maintained at an artificially high level so that 
it continues to be a serious threat to commercial lumbering interests. 
Continuous and expensive applications of pesticides only serve to prevent 
the budworm from totally destroying the spruce forests but cannot do 
more than that. The end result, though, is the peril this behavior has 
placed people in. 5 
These serve as examples of how the lack of risk assessment has 
produced serious consequences, and all those involved in risk assessment 
can see the lessons to be learned from these situations. Yet, it is his­
torians, who, as primary keepers of the past, are most likely to use the 
experiences judiciously in future situations. I happen to think that had 
historians been consulted in the beginning stages of each of these "cri­
ses," they would have called upon their sense of the past and suggested 
that the participants humble themselves before the unknown and cau­
tiously, ever so cautiously, venture forth with a "solution." They would 
have done so, I think, not because they knew more or better, but be­
cause, as I have said previously, they know how uncertain the future 
is and that, lacking any ability to see into the future, a conservative 
approach to acting is called for. We know the future, historians would 
have said, only as well as we understand the past. 
But however that may be, the important thing here is that all such 
accounts only reinforce the fundamental assumption of historians that the 
burden of proof is upon those who would argue that almost all risks are 
tolerable. And also, such persons must "prove" what the limits of that 
toleration are within the bounds of a future dictated in large measure 
by what historians know about the past. 
In summary, then, I can suggest that historians can bring three 
things generally missing from the risk assessment process to that proc­
ess. One, they will bring the sense of humility that is built into the 
discipline as a cautionary component. Two, they would make a real effort 
to keep all assessment activity within the heritage and cultural framework 
of society. And, three, they would ask the "right" questions so that 
"right" answers can be discerned. Taken together these three prop­
ositions should constitute sufficient reason to include historians into risk 
assessments of pesticides in the future. 
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On July 4, 1985, scores of Americans were not celebrating their 
country' s independence but were if! hospital emergency rooms. They 
were innocent victims of pesticide residues. Days after the poisonings, 
California officials ordered more than a million striped watermelons to be 
destroyed. Aldicarb, banned for use on melons in the U.S., had ruined 
at least five percent of the annual watermelon crop. Outside America, 
problems with pesticides loom even larger. A recent study by a former 
Environmental Protection Agency scientist (who worked in the Office of 
Pesticide Programs and the Office of Toxic Substances) estimates that 
pesticides cause 10,000 deaths and 400,000 illnesses per year 
worldwide . 1 
Stopping such deaths is not an easy matter because pesticides are 
also often life savers . To increase agricultural productivity to meet 
rising food demand and to improve public health in tropical areas suf­
fering from insect- borne diseases, pest control is necessary. Without 
adequate pest control, up to one-third of Asian rice production could 
be lost to insects annually; 2 and up to 20 percent of U. S. fruit and 
vegetable crops could be lost to plant diseases each year. 3 Even with 
dramatic increases in pesticide use in recent decades, the percentage of 
crops lost to pests apparently has not declined. 4 
Pesticides present a dilemma. As their hazards increase, so does 
the need for pest control. As they become more and more expensive, 
so does the apparent economic need for them. Although they have opened 
new ways of improving agriculture and public health, they have closed 
other ways, and they have made us dependent on them. 
One way of resolving the practical side of the pesticide dilemma is 
through integrated pest management ( I PM): managing pests better 
without excessive pollution. All IPM strategies are a matter of deter­
mining how pests, crops, weather, climate, soils, and topography interact 
in a particular location and then deciding carefully about how, when, and 
where to apply pesticides. The U.S . Office of Technology Assessment 
estimates that if 1PM were employed, pesticide use in U. S . agriculture 
could be reduced by as much as 75 percent. 5 
Although IPM might help resolve the practica l side of the pesticide 
dilemma , by reducing risks while protecting crops, a larger conceptual 
problem exists . How is one to identify, estimate, and evaluate risks 
associated with pesticides? There are no methods, taken either singly 
or together, which provide wholly objective assessments of pesticide risk. 
Instead, there are numerous value-laden methodologies, the use of each 
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of which often raises as many conceptual questions as the practical ones 
it is designed to answer. The methodologies are value-laden because 
every situation evaluated by risk assessors is empirically underdetermined 
in some way. As a consequence of this empirical underdetermination, 
assessors are forced to make myriad value judgments, all within the 
confines of accepted risk methodology. 
In subsequent pages, I shall outline some of the central occasions 
in risk-assessment methodology which force the assessor to make value 
judgments, interpretations, and extrapolations. I attempt to clarify risk 
assessment in three main ways. First, I outline some of the major con­
ceptual and practical problems associated with identifying, estimating, 
and evaluating risks. Second, I outline three dilemmas which, regardless 
of progress in scientific methods such as those of epidemiology, are likely 
to continue to pose nearly insurmountable obstacles for the risk­
evaluation stage of risk assessment. I call these three obstacles (1) the 
Contributor's Dilemma, (2) the Threshold Dilemma, and (3) the Consent 
Dilemma. Third, I close by suggesting two ways in which to improve 
risk-analysis methods and to avoid the worst consequences of the value 
judgments encountered within it. 
Risk Analysis 
Widely touted as a "developing science, " 6 the new discipline of risk 
assessment or risk analysis is currently being used by engineers, stat­
isticians, epidemiologists, economists, and policymakers, both to identify 
technological threats to our health and safety and to evaluate their ac­
ceptability. The goal of quantitative risk assessment is to deliver society 
from the twin extremes of dangerous and unrestrained technological de­
velopment and from ignorant and paranoid opposition to all new technol­
ogies. Instead, it offers a middle ground, an analytic framework within 
which thousands of risks can be comparatively evaluated--from those 
posed by liquefied natural gas facilities and nuclear fission to those 
caused by new contraceptives and pesticides. 
In employing a comparative framework within which diverse risks 
may be evaluated, assessors aim to give policymakers a rational basis for 
decisions about health and safety. They provide schemes showing how 
to save the most lives for the available dollars and how to spend funds 
so as to reduce the greatest hazards first. Risk assessment enables 
society, first, to maximize the benefits of government expenditures for 
health and safety. Second, it promotes equity and consistency in allo­
cation of funds among safety programs. 
As one thinker put it, risk assessment provides a framework for 
asking "why OSHA intends, in a set of proposed regulations on coke-oven 
emissions, to protect the lives of steelworkers at $5 million each, while 
a national Pap smear screening program that would save women's lives 
at less than $100,000 each has gone unfunded. " 7 In sum, risk assessment 
responds to our reasonable demands for efficiency and equity in reducing 
risks. 
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The greatest liability of quantified risk assessment, according to its 
critics, is that it attempts to reduce qualitatively diverse risks to mere 
mathematical probabilities and numbers of fatalities . They also charge 
that it threatens to remove health and safety from democratic social 
control and to place it in the hands of experts who want to dictate when 
and why many of society's fears about technological hazards are irra­
tional . 
Apart from whether opponents of risk analysis are correct in their 
allegations about its political liabilities, there are other risks of risk as­
sessment. These conceptual risks are important precisely because they 
often are not recognized by practitioners of risk analysis . Because they 
are not, risk-assessment conclusions sometimes err in relying on a number 
of crucial, but unrecognized, value judgments. 
Risk-assessment methods are generally dividied into three classes 
corresponding to the three stages of risk analysis: risk identification, 
risk estimation, and risk evaluation. The standard view, according to 
Starr, Whipple, Okrent, Maxey, Cohen, Lee, and other well-known risk 
assessors, is that expert methods employed in the first two stages of risk 
identification and risk estimation are objective and neutral, whereas the 
methods employed in the last stage, risk evaluation, a re somewhat sub­
jective and evaluative . 8 
The Three Stages of Risk Analysis 
In claiming that risk identification and risk estimation a re objective 
and value-free, Starr, Whipple, and others forget a variety of unavoid­
able evaluative judgments that arise in connection with risk methods . 
Let's outline briefly some of these conceptual or methodological risks of 
risk assessment, and then sketch some ways to avoid their worst conse­
quences . 
"Risk" is generally defined as a compound measure of the perceived 
probability and magnitude of adverse effect, and it is often expressed 
in terms of average annual probability of fatality. Each of the three areas 
of risk assessment--risk identification, risk estimation, and risk 
evaluation--poses its own conceptual problems . 9 
It is difficult, first, to identify risks because each of the five 
commonly used methods of identification has serious defects whose pres­
ence requires the assessor to make evaluative judgments . The use of 
case clusters, for example, looking for adverse effects to appear in a 
particular place, is helpful (1) only when specific hazards cause unique 
diseases and (2) only when the population at risk is known in some detail . 
Since often it is not known whether conditions (1) and (2) a re satisfied, 
especially in cases involving new risks, the assessor must interpret the 
situation as best he can. 
Comparison of compounds in terms of structural toxicology, a second 
method of risk identification, likewise is problematic. It reveals only that 
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a toxin, for example, has the same structure as a carcinogen. Yet, in 
using this method, assessors typically assume that this similarity of 
structure is sufficient to determine that a substance is a positive 
carcinogen. Use of a third identifying method, mutagenicity assays, also 
relies on a normative judgment. It is weak in that it rests on the as­
sumption that most chemical carcinogens are mutagens; mutagencity 
assays are rarely sufficient to support the conclusion that a particular 
mutagen is also carcinogenic. 
A fourth method of risk identification, long-term animal bioassays, 
is a weak method for identifying risks in that it depends on the inference 
that results from animal experiments are applicable to humans. 
A fifth class of methods, biostatistical epidemiological studies, are 
more sophisticated case clusters. They aim to show an association be­
tween an agent and a disease. The obvious deficiencies with this method 
are that it is often difficult to accumulate the relevant evidence, partic­
ularly if exposure is at low dosage or if the effects are delayed, like 
cancers with latency periods of up to 40 years. In the absence of com­
plete data and long years of testing, assessors are forced to interpret 
and to extrapolate from the data which they do have. Moreover, most 
substances are not even tested using epidemiological methods. Th is is 
because, apart from other sources of hazards, there are roughly 60,000 
chemicals used in various manufacturing processes, and at least 1,000 
new ones are added each year. 10 Deciding which of the chemicals to test, 
when not all can be tested by means of this method, is perhaps one of 
the greatest evaluative judgments in risk identification. 
At the second stage of risk assessment, risk estimation, one is 
concerned primarily with determining three things: a dose-response re­
lationship for a particular hazard, the population at risk, and the dose 
it receives from the hazard. Dose-response methods are conceputally 
problematic because they require extrapolation from high to low doses 
and from animals to humans. The problems associated with such ex­
trapolation a re well known, as when health physicists try to extrapolate 
a dose-response curve for low-level radiation exposure, given data points 
only for higher-level exposures. Environmentalists, industry represen­
tatives, and government bodies have each extrapolated to a different 
dose-response curve for low-level effects of radiation. On the basis of 
their differing value judgments, they have concluded that low-level ef­
fects of radiation are, respectively, very dangerous, not dangerous at 
all, and moderately dangerous. 11 
Estimating the population at risk and the dose received is just as 
problematic, for at least two reasons. Actual measurements of particular 
doses, e.g., of a chemical, cannot be made in all situations; as a con­
sequence, a mathematical model of assumed exposure must be used. Such 
estimates are also problematic because seemingly unimportant pathways 
of exposure can assume great significance owing to biomagnification due 
to food-chain and synergistic effects. Moveover, it is rare that a sub­
stance is uniformly distributed across pathways or across time. For all 
these reasons, the assessor is forced to make a number of interpretative 
judgments. 
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At the third stage of risk assessment, risk evaluation, analysts 
typically determine whether a risk is acceptable to society. They employ 
at least four different methods: risk-cost-benefit analysis ( RCBA), re­
vealed preferences, expressed preferences, and natural standards. 
RCBA is widely used and consists simply of converting the risks, 
costs, and benefits associated with a particular project to monetary terms 
and then aggregating each of them to determine whether the risks and 
costs outweigh the benefits . 12 The great advantage of RCBA is that it 
allows assessors to calculate how to save the greatest number of lives for 
the fewest dollars. Its most obvious deficiency is that simply adding up 
risks, costs, and benefits ignores who gets what, the equity of the 
distribution . In using RCBA, assessors are thus forced to make the 
highly evaluative ethical judgment that the magnitude of risks, costs, 
and benefits is more important than their distribution and that distri­
bution need not be taken account of at all. 
The second method of risk evaluation, revealed preferences, consists 
of making inductive inferences about acceptable risk on the basis of the 
levels of risk which existed in the past. 13 The most worrisome assump­
tion in this method is that past societal risk levels reveal correct or de­
sirable risk levels for the present. This assumption requires one to judge 
that the present ought to be like the past regarding risk and that what 
risk was accepted in the past ought to have been accepted. Both of these 
assumptions involve highly evaluative judgments, since past levels of risk 
may be indefensible in certain aspects and since our ethical obligations 
regarding present risk may be greater than those regarding past risk. 
The third method of risk evaluation, expressed preferences, consists 
of using psychometric surveys to determine the acceptability of particular 
risks . 14 It is built on the questionable assumption that the preferences 
people express via instruments such as surveys provide reliable indica­
tors as to acceptable risks. Obviously, however, preferences are not 
always authentic indicators of welfare: some persons have irrational fears 
and other persons are too ignorant to realize a serious risk. This method 
also requires the assessor to make a number of evaluative judgments 
whenever he encounters inconsistencies in survey preferences or failure 
of the responses to correspond with actual behavior regarding risk. 
The fourth method of risk evaluation, natural standards, uses 
geological and biological criteria to determine risk levels current du ring 
the evolution of the species. 15 This method is based on the assumption 
that if a particular level of risk was present in the past, then that same 
level is acceptable at present . The obvious problem, however, is again 
that because a risk "is" present naturally does not mean that we "ought" 
to allow it to remain, especially if it can be avoided or if no overarching 
benefits arise from allowing the risk to remain high. Moreover, since 
the method is based on a "natural standard" for each different hazard, 
it totally fails to take account of synergistic or cumulative effects that 
could be many orders of magnitude greater than the actual "standard 
level" of exposure. 
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Risk Assessment and Values 
All the assumptions, extrapolations, and inferences built into each 
of the methods in the three stages of risk assessment appear to arise 
because nearly every situation of risk identification, estimation, or 
evaluation is empirically underdetermined. Because it is empirically 
underdetermined, the assessor is forced to make some value judgments 
so as to interpret the data available to him. At root, these assumptions 
and inferences often reduce to the problem of getting a grip on causality . 
This is difficult since causes are not seen; they are inferred on the basis 
of their effects. Cancers, for example, don't wear tags saying they were 
caused by their subjects' smoking, or by use of oral contraceptives, or 
by diet drinks, or by breathing the emissions of the chemical plant next 
door. Moreover, we know statistically how much of one agent causes 
cancer, but we don't know in individual cases whether a given agent 
caused a particular cancer. We are only able to infer what caused a 
certain cancer. 
A classic example of the difficulty of establishing causality of harm, 
given a certain probability of risk, occurred during the fifties and the 
sixties, when U. S. servicemen were exposed to above-ground, nuclear­
weapons tests in western U.S. and in the south Pacific. Many of them 
were within five miles of ground zero for as many as 23 separate explo­
sions, or were marched to within 300 yards of ground zero, immediately 
after detonation. Yet, of the half a million soldiers so exposed, only ten 
have won benefits when they or their survivors claimed that their deaths 
and injuries were caused by the fallout . 16 True, a good risk assessor 
can use statistical methods to determine when there is a significant rise 
in particular deaths or injuries. But in the end, all he has is a corre­
lation and never a strict proof of causality, even in experiments with 
strict controls . As a consequence, there is always some data lacking, 
some need for inference, extrapolation, and simplification. This means 
that even the best situations are empirically underdetermined and force 
one into the realm of doing philosophy, and making value judgments under 
the guise of doing science. 
Two Problematic Risk Assessments 
Sometimes the philosophy underlying a particular risk assessment 
is done well; other times, the methodological assumptions are so suspect, 
on logical, ethical, and epistemological grounds, that the resulting risk 
estimates are of questionable value. One famous example of such a risk 
assessment is that of Herbert lnhaber . His study was commissioned by 
the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board and then summarized in Sci­
ence. The major conclusions of his study, which estimated the risks from 
alternative energy technologies, were ( 1) that the risk from conventional 
energy systems, like nuclear or coal power, is less than that from non­
conventional systems, like solar or wind energy, and (2) that non­
catastrophic risks are greater than catastrophic risks . 17 
How did lnhaber arrive at his surprising conclusions? He made some 
highly questionable evaluative assumptions. In estimating the risk posed 
by particular energy technologies, he assumed, for example, that all 
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electricity was of utility-grid quality. 18 This means that the low-risk 
benefits of solar space heating and hot-water heating, indeed the low­
temperatu re forms of solar which could supply 40 percent of U. S. energy 
needs at little risk, were ignored. Another assumption central to his 
risk estimates is that all nonconventional energy technologies have coal 
backups . 19 This means, for example, that in the case of solar thermal 
electric, 89 percent of the risk attributed to it comes not from the solar 
(especially construction of components) but from the coal backup, which 
he classifies as a solar risk! Moreover, lnhaber assumes that nuclear 
fission requires no backup, 2 0 even though these plants experience a down 
time of approximately 33 percent per year for checkups, refueling, and 
repairs . 
In the area of risk evaluation, lnhaber's assumptions are just as 
questionable. When he aggregates and compares all lost work days, for 
all energy technologies, he ignores the fact that lost work days are more 
or less severe, depending on the nature of the accident causing them 
and whether or not they are sequential. On lnhaber's scheme, a lost 
work day due to cancer or to exposure to a toxin with mutagenic effects 
(likely to affect one's children) is no different than a lost work day from 
a sprained ankle . 21 
lnhaber made a similar questionable assumption in evaluating the 
severity of risks. Unlike other risk assessors, he totally ignored the 
distinction between catastrophic/noncatastrophic risks and assumed that 
1, 000 construction workers, each falling off a roof and dying in separate 
accidents, was no different than 1,000 workers dying because of a cat­
astrophic accident in a nuclear fuel fabrication plant . 22 Were one to trace 
lnhaber's methods, step by step, it would be clear that virtually every 
assumption he makes in estimating and evaluating alternative risks has 
the effect of increasing his alleged conventional risks and decreasing his 
alleged nonconventional risks. 
Another example of a risk analysis with questionable evaluative as­
sumptions is the Ramsey and Russell 23 article in a recent issue of Public 
Policy. In this classic piece, Ramsey and Russell calculated the total 
public and occupational risk from nuclear and coal energy cycles. They 
discounted future deaths at five percent per year and then concluded 
that coal power was ten times more risky than nuclear energy . If a zero 
discount rate were used for deaths, however, so that immediate and 
long-term deaths were weighted the same, then their conclusion would 
reverse by three orders of magnitude: nuclear energy is more than a 
hundred times more risky than generation of electricity from coal. 
Even if risk-assessment situations were not empirically underdeter­
mined, for all the reasons already surveyed, and even if persons such 
as lnhaber, Russell, and Ramsey avoided their questionable means of 
aggregating and estimating risks, values would unavoidably enter the 
risk-assessment process . This is because value judgments are often the 
only ways to resolve some of the ethical dilemmas facing risk assessors. 
Consider three of the most prominent such difficulties . I call them (1) 
the contributor's dilemma, (2) the threshold dilemma, and (3) the consent 
dilemma. 
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Ethical Judgments and Risk Evaluation 
The contributor's dilemma is this. Citizens are subject to numerous 
small risks, e .g., to certain carcinogens, each of which is allegedly ac­
ceptable; yet, together such exposures are clearly unacceptable . Each 
of the numerous carcinogens to which we are exposed, e.g . , asbestos, 
vinyl chloride, radiation, is alleged to be acceptable because it is below 
the threshold at which some statistically significant increase in harm oc­
curs. Yet, statistically speaking, 25 to 33 percent of us are going to 
die from cancers, 90 percent of which are environmentally induced and 
hence theoretically preventable. 24 Many of the cancers are obviously 
caused by the aggregation of numerous exposures to carcinogens, no one 
of which alone is alleged to be harmful. 
The contributor's dilemma is especially problematic for risk assessors 
because it forces them both to assume (in the case of aggregate risks) 
and not to assume (in the case of individual risks) that the whole risk 
faced by an individual is greater than the sum of the parts of that risk. 
Risk assessors who condone subthreshold risks, but who condemn the 
deaths caused by the aggregate of those subthreshold risks, are some­
thing like the bandits who eat the tribesmen's lunches in the following 
famous story of Jonathan Glover. 
Suppose a village contains 100 unarmed tribesmen eating their lunch. 
One hundred hungry armed bandits descend on the village, and each 
bandit at gun-point takes one tribesman 's lunch and eats it. The 
bandits then go off, each one having done a discriminable amount 
of ha rm to a single tribesman. Next week, the bandits a re tempted 
to do the same thing again, but are troubled by new-found doubts 
about the morality of such a raid. Their doubts are put to rest 
by one of their number (a government risk assessor] .... 
They then raid the village, tie up the tribesmen, and look at their 
lunches. As expected, each bowl of food contains 100 baked 
beans.... Instead of each bandit eating a single plateful as last 
week, each (of the 100 bandits) takes one bean from each (of the 
100 plate(s). They leave after eating all the beans, pleased to have 
done no harm, as each has done no more than subthreshold harm 
to each person. 25 
The obvious question raised by this example is how a risk assessor 
can say that both subthreshold exposures are harmless, as the data in­
dicate, and yet that the sum, or contribution, of these exposures causes 
great harm. It appears that risk assessors need to amend their theory 
regarding additive or synergistic risks like cancer. 
The th res hold di lemma poses many of the same problems as the 
contributor's dilemma. It consists of the fact that society must declare 
some threshold for the acceptability of a given risk (e.g., that it would 
cause less than a 10 6 increase in one's average annual probability of 
fatality), since a zero-risk society is impossible. Yet, no threshold 
standard is able to provide equal protection from harm to all citizens. 
Choosing the 10 6 standard appears eminently reasonable, both because 
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society must attempt to reduce larger risks first and because 10 6 is the 
natural-hazards mortality rate. This choice poses us with a dilemma, 
however, because it is a standard based on average annual probability 
of fatality . 
Because this 10 6 th res hold seems acceptable, on the average , 
however, does not mean that it is acceptable to each individual. Most 
civil rights , for example, are not accorded on the basis of the average 
needs of persons but on the basis of individual rights. For instance , 
we do not accord constitutionally guaranteed civil rights to public edu ­
cation on the basis of average characteristics of students. If we did, 
then retarded children or gifted children would have rights only to ed ­
ucation for children at the average level. Instead, we say that according 
"equal" civil rights to education means according "comparable education , " 
given one ' s aptitudes and needs. That is why the state can provide 
special schools for both the retarded and the gifted . 
This example from the field of education raises an interesting 
question for risk assessment; if civil rights to education are accorded 
on the basis of individual, not average, characteristics, then why are 
civil rights to equal protection from risks not accorded on the basis of 
individual, rather than average, characteristics? Why is a 10 6 average 
th res hold accepted for everyone, without compensation, when adopting 
it poses risks higher than 10 6 for the elderly, for children, for persons 
with previous exposures to carcinogens , for those with allergies, for 
persons who must lead sedentary lives, and for the poor? Blacks, for 
example , face higher risks from air pollution than do whites, even though 
they share the same "average" exposure. 26 
A third dilemma faced by assessors who must estimate and evaluate 
risks is the consent dilemma. It a rises from the fact that imposition of 
certain risks is legitimate only after consent is obtained from the affected 
parties, and that all those genuinely able to give legitimate consent are 
precisely those who likely will never do so. 
Probably the best example of the consent dilemma arises in workplace 
situations. Here there is an alleged compensating wage differential noted 
both by economists and risk assessors. According to the theory behind 
the alleged differential, the more risky the occupation, the higher the 
wage required to compensate the worker for bearing the risk, all things 
being equal . 2 7 Moreover, imposition of these higher workplace risks is 
legitimate apparently only after the worker consents, with knowledge of 
the risks involved, to perform the work for the agreed-upon wage. But 
the dilemma arises once one considers who is most likely to give legitimate 
informed consent. It is a person who is well educated and adequately 
informed about the risk, especially its long-term and probabilistic effects. 
It is a person who is not forced, under dire financial constraints, to take 
a job he knows is likely to harm him. Yet, sociological data reveal that, 
as education and income rise, persons are less willing to take risky jobs 
and that those who do so are primarily poorly educated or financially 
strapped. 2 • This means that the very set of persons least able to give 
free, informed consent to workplace risks are precisely those who most 
often are said to give consent. 
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If this observation about workplace risk is accurate, then medical 
experimentation may have something to teach us about risk assessment. 
We know that the promise of early release for a prisoner who consents 
to risky medical experimentation provides a highly coercive context that 
could jeopardize his legitimate consent. So also high wages for a des­
perate worker who consents to take a risky job provides a highly coercive 
context which could jeopardize his legitimate consent. What is the way 
out of this dilemma? 
Two Suggestions for Improving Risk Analysis 
Although there is no space here to develop extensive arguments for 
the best ways to avoid some of the most detrimental effects of the three 
dilemmas just outlined, there are two possible solutions. One is to use 
weighted risk-cost-benefit analysis (RCBA), putting ethical weights on 
each of the RCBA parameters to counteract the consequences of the di­
lemmas noted earlier. Thus, for example, when we faced the contribu­
tor's dilemma, we could put heavier weights, or costs, on allegedly 
acceptable individual risks which combine to form unacceptable aggregate 
risks . 29 
The other solution is to use an adversary system of assessment. 
This amounts to requiring that a number of different risk assessments 
be performed for the same project, and that each assessment employ al­
ternative ethical and methodological assumptions as the basis of its cal­
culations. Once these alternative assessments were completed, then 
policymakers and the public could debate their merits and observe how 
alternative methodological and ethical assumptions generate alternative 
risk estimates and evaluations. 3 0 Such a strategy would allow the public 
and policymakers to choose not only which risks they want but also which 
philosophies (ethics and methodologies) to use in identifying, estimating, 
and evaluating those risks. 
Using both ethically weighted assessment and adversary assessment 
amounts to spelling out our philosophical assumptions as well as our 
conclusions about risk. These steps would take us closer to the 
public-policy ideal of Albert Einstein, who urged that all important issues 
be publicly debated in "the market place of ideas . " 
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TECHNOLOGY RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE IS-OUGHT FALLACY: 
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The whole of Science Policy, Ethics and Economic Methodology argues 
forcefully for a radical change in current technology assessment meth­
odology. Kristin Shrader-Frechette argues convincingly for the necessity 
of input from ethicists and philosophers as well as the general public 
through democratic participation in order that all the evidence might be 
weighed from all possible standpoints prior to reaching a policy decision. 
My whole-hearted agreement with her main conclusion and contentions 
does not stop there but follows her through most of her reasons and 
arguments as well. However, I have a problem with one small part of 
her argument; this in turn offers me the opportunity of arguing for my 
own main concern, namely, the grounding required for an intrinsic value 
for our environment. I also believe that a laying bare of the fallacy 
contained in the usual understanding of the "naturalistic fallacy", will 
help to further strengthen her position, while opening the door for the 
next step to a better approach to TA's and EIA's that is, the search for 
a basis for philosophically sound normative positions. 
Under the heading of "The Fallacy of Unfinished Business" 
Shrader-Frechette cites and apparently embraces G. E. Moore's indictment 
of the "is-ought" fallacy. I intend to focus on the application of Moore's 
thought to her argument in favor of eliminating purely scientific decisions 
from technology assessments (she views this scientific component as de­
cisive, as the one coming from the "experts"). She also sees the problem 
of equating scientific "facts" with the "is" in Moore's doctrine. Scientists 
assume this equation, and her whole book carefully argues against this 
assumption. I want to take the argument a step further: I contend 
that--when properly understood--the "naturalistic fallacy" can no longer 
be viewed as fallacious within the context of technology assessments. I 
will briefly examine how she establishes her posit ion in regard to Moore, 
then offer some criticism of her position which, I believe, should defend 
the so-cal led "is-ought" fallacy. After that, I wi II develop my own ar­
gument by a further discussion of her position, in Section 1; a discussion 
of possible grounds for an environmental ethic in Section 2; in Section 
3, I will return to Moore and another possible approach to an environ­
mental ethic; in Section 4, I will seek yet anoth e r ground for this en­
terprise; in Section 5, I will review all possible grounds for an 
environmental ethic examined in the three previous sections; finally, in 
Section 6, I will return once again to the "natura listic fallacy" and con­
clude. 
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Section I - The Argument 
The problem Shrader-Frechette wants to lay bare is mainly that of 
the alleged superiority (and sufficiency) of the scientific method and 
viewpoint, when issues affecting the public interests are under consid ­
eration . Scientifically minded technology assessors, she affirms : 
hope to avoid the morass of allegedly subjective normative 
judgements and to arrive at more objective, scientific ones ... They 
hope that their reduction (of ethical to technical factors) will help 
achieve closure on the problem at hand. 1 
This she deems wrong, yet she does not wish to exclude science 
altogether from the process of assessment: she simply wants it to be a 
factor, not the only factor taken into consideration. Therefore, she cites 
the "naturalistic fallacy", and recognizes that science views itself in the 
role of "is". My criticism, as mentioned above, is a two-fold one. The 
most blatant problem arises precisely in this self-viewing by science. 
The whole thrust of Shrader-Frechette's argument throughout her volume 
is aimed at proving beyond a doubt that "science" (as understood and 
applied in the context under consideration) is other than or more than 
"just pure facts." She argues convincingly that behind the scientific 
approach a host of undefended assumptions, biases and unquestioned 
inferences is hidden . If her argument is correct, and I believe it is -­
then "science" in this context is not an "is", rather it distorts and re­
presents in a fragmented and often misleading way what it purports to 
simply man if est and explain. Shrader-Frechette amply proves and ably 
argues this view of science throughout her book through a host of ex­
amples. 
But if the "is" which purports to ground the "ought" and thus give 
rise to the so- called "naturalistic fallacy" is not a real "is", that is if it 
does not faithfully manifest and unfold the existential reality of the en­
tities it discusses, then this "fallacy" is not really committed by the 
proponents of "science alone", as the source of all solutions. Does this 
mean that, therefore, Shrader-Frechette is wrong and no fallacy is being 
committed? Not at all, fallacies, are being committed. The latter, how­
ever, are rather grounded in "scientism" or "ethnocentric reasoning" 2 
on the part of the scientist or bureaucrat who wou ld defend this position. 
The charge of "naturalistic fallacy", on the other hand, is thus an im­
proper one; the more thorough and convincing one believes Shrader­
Frechette ' s argument to be, the more obviously wrong the charge. 
The second objection I want to raise, and the more serious one, 
centers on the fallaciousness of the "is-ought" position as such. When 
we are concerned with risk assessment, we need to examine what really 
is the case quite seriously . As we will see, environmental considerations 
require that we respect the integrity functioning and specific features 
of various ecosystems, including all aspects they manifest, human and 
non-human. Their existential reality is essential to ground our ethical 
reasoning. The question that arises, therefore, is whether it is possible 
to avoid altogether the so-called "naturalistic fallacy", and whether it is 
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even desirable to do so, when we are discussing risks and possible en­
vironmental damage. 
One might well ask, before an attempt is made to decide on this 
question, what are ethical doctrines usually based on? 
Section 11 - A Question of Grounds 
Before addressing the specific question of grounding for environ­
mental ethics, one should examine ethical grounding in general, at least 
in a cursory manner, appropriate for the format of this paper. A brief 
overview of current ethical doctrines, might well start with systems based 
on utility. Util ity is the most serious contender as absolute ground, 
especially in the context we are examining, and from the standpoint of 
economists and others currently involved in technology assessments and 
risk/cost/benefit analyses. And what is "utility" based upon? It is based 
on what every man is, i.e., desirous of happiness; this represents his 
innate drive and natural inclination. It seems obvious that J . S. Mill 
would agree with this statement. On the other hand, the common human 
reality of being capable of pleasure in varying degrees and of pain 
grounds Bentham 's thought. If man could not feel pleasure and pain or 
universally desire happiness, the basis for both approaches to 
utilitarianism would no longer make sense. Once again, what man is, 
not in the sense of an exhaustive essential definition, but in that of 
absolutely essential universal properties all men possess, grounds both 
doctrines. 
If one bases an ethical theory on rights (and the interests they 
represent) or on compacts and agreements between rational agents or 
even on "justice", one is once again upholding a specific understanding 
of what man is. Human beings are viewed as intrinsically valuable per­
haps, or as such that they are capable of pains and pleasures, so that 
it is prudential for each of them to respect these characteristics in oth­
ers, in order to have their own equally respected. 
To sum up, if one rejects traditional metaphysical definitions of 
"what man is," and the ability of such understanding to ground an ethical 
system, one is still reduced to start from a specific yet universal 
understanding of a human being: human beings are understood within 
these theories as "rational", as "persons", able to feel pain and pleasure, 
to be prudent on their own behalf, perhaps respect others, whether for 
prudential reason or altruistic ones. 
In the present context, we require an ethic that can extend to all 
components of ecosystems, human and non-human as well. Now an en­
vironmental ethic is notoriously hard to ground. The choices available 
a re not limitless. I have discussed elsewhere the problems of locating 
this ground in regard to the rights of future generations. 3 It is perhaps 
possible to extend in some way one of the accepted homocentric ap ­
proaches, though I have not been able to succeed in that enterprise so 
far. Then there are several ways of grounding a purely environmental 
(non specifically human) ethic. The easiest way perhaps, is to ground 
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it upon human rights, as William Blackstone does, for instance . " If we 
have a right to a iivable environment, then surely would-be polluters 
have duties to ensure that our rights in this respect are protected. Then 
there are authors such as Stone and Singer 5 who argue for corresponding 
rights based on the interests of non-human live entities, such as trees , 
for the former, animals for the latter. For our purpose, and against the 
background of risk-assessments , the most appropriate approach seems 
to be one based on the ecosystem as a whole, such as that of Aldo 
Leopold . 6 
The present format will not permit an in-depth discussion. For our 
purpose, the important point to note is that all of these approaches are 
to some extent based on an "is", i . e., an existential reality . We are 
an imals of the kind that requires a certain type of environment in order 
to live and to enjoy a worthwhile life. Or, one might say in a shift of 
emphasis, animals are intelligent, sentient beings and, therefore, we must 
respect their interests and feelings of satisfaction or pain, without being 
limited by prejudice and homocentricity. 
It is because of what we or they, or even "all" is that certain 
consequences follow, or that certain interests and rights are established, 
while in turn demand certain duties. What is then the status of Moore's 
contention on the question of the "naturalistic Fallacy?" 
Section 111 - Moore Revisited 
One might perhaps agree in general with Moore 's contention , that 
" it is natural" is not equivalent to "it is good," and still turn to Moore 
himself for some possible alternative ways to understand his position. 
On the question of the subject matter of ethics, Moore acknowledges that 
... the grossest errors will be committed in such comparison (i . e., 
the relative values of various goods) if it is assumed that whenever 
two things form a whole, the value of that whole is merely the sum 
of the values of those two things . 7 
Further on, in his discussion of "Naturalistic Ethics", he talks about 
the value of "health" . Is "health" good? Moore admits he is "not pre­
pared to dispute" that statement. On the other hand he does not wish 
to take "healthy is good" as an obvious statement, needing neither 
qualifications nor discussion. One can easily grant him his contention 
if one adduces just one example: "healthy" (i . e . , vital, vigorously 
growing) cancer cells are not good . One needs to specify or qualify . 
Combining health with existence (as in "conducive to continued exist­
ence" . for example) seems to render "health" a good, if it is further 
joined with the notion of "Wholeness" . Thus healthy cancerous cells are 
no longer "good" as they pertain to a small part only, and are in fact 
deleterious to health (of the whole) and not conducive to the continued 
existence of the latter . 
Existence itself, while it may not be a "perfection" in Kant's sense, 
is surely a good, the grounding good for any good whatsoever. This 
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approach is not new, but it is in line with recent studies in environmental 
ethics. For instance, in his paper "Is there an Ecological Ethics?, " 
Holmes Rolston 111 argues that 
The claim that morality is a derivative of holistic character of the 
ecosystem proves more radical, for the ecological perspective pene­
trates not only the secondary, but also the primary qualities of the 
ethic. 
And below he adds, 
Construct values though man may, he operates in an environmental 
context where he must ground his values in ecosystemic obedience. 
This "must" is ecologically descriptive: certain laws in fact cir­
cumscribe him and embrace his value enterprises.• 
The approach, Rolston claims, is more than scientific (e.g., other 
than merely scientific--as understooc:r- for our purpose); itlS 
metaecological instead. It is, to some extent, based on Aldo Leopold and 
the key claim of his "land ethic": 
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability 
and beauty of a biotic community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise. 9 
It is also in line with the values of "existence" and "health", 
holistically understood, as our discussion of Moore indicated, in the 
previous section. In this sense, both of these can be seen as extensions 
from our own right and duty to perserve our biotic integrity within the 
system we are a part of, Rolston describes this enterprise as "the mar­
riage and mutual transformation of ecological description and evaluation," 
whereby "an 'ought' is not so much derived from an 'is' as discovered 
simultaneously with it." 10 The "ought" is discovered in the perceived 
"systemic rightness", a much wider and deeper concept than a mere 
scientific assessment of this or that aspect of the ecosystem, especially 
when the latter is prepared in the service of a specific project, aim, goal 
or interest. I will return to this point in the concluding section of this 
paper. 
Section IV - "Intelligibility" as Ground 
A further possible ground for value in eth ics may be seen in na­
ture's "intelligibility". 11 Aside from being naturally organized existing 
wholes, ecosystems are governed by universal laws. These laws may not 
all be known at this or any other time, but appear to be--in principle-­
knowable, that is, such that they can be grasped by reason. They are, 
in a word, rational. We have now arrived at a third possible component 
of a value for nature. Schmitz argues that the intelligibility nature as 
such manifests "ordination to their ground (i.e . , to the things of na­
ture) . .. ," which "accounts for their capacity of disclosure, i.e., intel-
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ligibility and truth." 12 This ordination is, therefore, also the basis for 
respect: 
It is this ordination that provides an imperative within them which 
the human intelligence must respect in its e_nquiry: viz. that their 
us . " 13truth is a value in itself before it is a value for 
This approach has a long and interesting background in the history 
of philosophy. Heraclitus was, perhaps, the first to connect the logos, 
or rationality of universal laws to intelligibility and value . Moreover, 
the ultimate worth of rationality is recognized in various ways by all 
proponents of homocentric ethical theories as well, at least in its 
signification of "active" or "agent" rationality (see Section 11 of this pa ­
per). It should not . be too hard to ascribe a corresponding value to 
"passive" rationality as well, that is, to intelligibility . Schmitz argues 
that "It is because the human intelligence is attuned to this 
transcendental capacity in things-- their intelligibility, their capacity for 
being taken up into a truth relationship--that our intelligence is enabled 
to engage in investigation into the very nature of nature itself." 14 He 
concludes that, 
It is this common bond with things that is the source of the deepest 
values of the human intelligence and of human life itself. 15 
Section V - Summing Up Possible Grounds for a Broad Ethical Theory 
If the last turn of argument is accepted, then we have isolated three 
possible sources of value, all three founded upon what is: ( 1) health 
(in its connection with holistic existence); (2) the existence of wholes 
(as more valuable than mere parts, or their sum); and (3) intelligibility 
as rationality within things or the existence of rational laws. To some 
extent one needs to take seriously and respect one or more of these as­
pects of natural entities if one is concerned with the environment and in 
general, with assessing man - made risks, even when these are possibly 
affecting present or future human beings . All three criteria upon which 
to establish broad-based environmental ethics are clearly grounded upon 
as "is", an existential reality which appears worthwhile, good and worth 
preserving and upholding. Even those who would deny the need for an 
ethic of environmental concern, and would restrict human reasoning about 
morality to present human entities, need to ground their doctrines in some 
"essential understanding of human beings, viz. human beings as pursuing 
happiness, or as sensitive, and thus capable of pleasure or pain. 
It is my contention that the sort of multifaceted "is" we have ex­
amined and discussed does not posit a fallacious ground for an "ought, " 
on one hand , and manifests an existential reality much different than that 
of the "science" Shrader- Frechette rightly sees as a faulty ground for 
T . A. 's and EIA 's . 
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Section VI - Shrader-Frechette and the "Naturalistic Fallacy" Conclusion 
Let us return to the twin problems posited at the outset. 
Shrader-Frechette points out that science or "the scientific methodology" 
assumes that it is equal to "the facts" or "what is". On the other hand, 
she argues vigorously for the bias, ideologizing, politicizing, yielding 
to pressure groups that unfortunately appears to be inextricably a part 
of "science" as it is currently practiced. She is not alone in th is con­
tention, for instance, speaking of the Nuclear industry against which she 
has also written eloquently, 16 a recent Canadian article states: 
The "number" selected for an environmental standard only appears 
to be derived directly from the pure disinterested inquiries of the 
laboratory: in fact it usually represents a rough compromise among 
vested interests, balancing science, politics and economy on the 
knife-edge of potential catastrophe. 17 
I totally agree with this line of argument: as assessment of any 
technology upon which public policy would be based cannot and must not 
be solely a product of the scientific community. This is so, precisely 
because of the very arguments and examples Shrader-Frechette cites. 
The problems she discloses and documents a re embedded in the scientific 
methodology of cost/benefit analyses. She identifies the Aggregation 
Assumption (discussed in her Chapter 5); the Assumption of partial 
Quantification (Chapter 6), as the main methodological assumptions. The 
underpinning for all problems she uncovers are linked to the fallacious 
"presupposition that Objectivity is Neutrality, " 18 which in turn justifies 
the "retreat from Ethical Analysis," as the purported "neutrality" is 
meant to serve the public interest best. It would be impractical to at­
tempt to reproduce her wealth of arguments and cite her copious examples 
here, Suffice to cite the two-pronged conclusion which underline the 
failure of this "public interest" objection. The first point is that 
... it fails because it ignores the fact that refusing to engage in 
normative analysis does not serve the public interest, but serves 
whatever interests are represented by the constitutive and contex­
tual values implicitly built into the TA/EIA data and 
methodology. 19 
The second point is that 
... it ignores the reality that public policy is made in a political 
environment. 20 Her analysis shows that "there is not public interest 
devoid of partisan values" or "abstract facts, devoid of constitutive 
or contextual values. " 21 
Therefore, even though Moore, too, identifies "factual" or 
"existential" with "scientific", perhaps the political and social realities 
of his time might have been better suited to attest to the validity of his 
claim. This validity, however, can no longer be claimed, a fortiori as 
we have seen, in the light of Shrader-Frechette's exhaustive analysis. 
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If science is- - if not inherently biased--surely at least intrinsically 
evaluative rather than neutral, then there must be yet another "is", 
obscured by those "facts" which science improperly purports to manifest 
and represent. It is this second, underlying "is" that needs to be un­
covered, layed bare, discussed and analyzed, freed from the obscuring 
elements of the previously discussed scientific "is", which is nothing but 
a travesty of existential reality. 
Once this new "is" is unmasked, then we will have a real "is" upon 
which to base at least to some extent our ecologically sensitive "oughts", 
and the charge of fallaciousness levied against this procedure will itself 
be understood as fallacious instead. This grounding "is" which Rolston 
describes as co-existential with its logically and really ensuing "ought" 
is clearly deeper than the "factual-as-scientific is" Schrader-Frechette 
analyses. The reason for this is not a necessary aspect of the scientific 
enterprise, it is not the result of any scientific "ought". On the con­
trary, science as such ought to be "socially responsible" rather than 
"socially dependent," as Agazzi, for instance, puts it: 
The primary task of science must remain the search for truth (i . e., 
for the partial and never fully confirmed truth that is connected 
with its noetic structure). 22 
"Truth", in turn, is a wide and serious concept, much better able 
to substantiate a possible connection with "good" than the sort of frag­
mentary "facts" we were discussing . On the other hand, when we are 
dealing with risk-assessment in real issues through Technology Assess­
ment and Environmental Impact Assessments based upon cost/benefit an­
alyses, we must deal with science within the existing political realities, 
not "ideal" science, or science as it ought to be. In that case, after 
stating what science's real role ought to be, we must strive to recover 
the realities obscured by the present social environment. 
It seems to me that when we do recognize the goal and attempt to 
succeed in our quest to uncover and recover this ecologically sound "is", 
the so-called "Naturalistic fallacy" will no longer be seen as fallicious, 
as I have argued . 
Many have remarked about the "ills of contemporary science"; 
Laszlo, for instance, adds the qualifier that these "concern primarily the 
impact of its application to society." He recognizes t hat, 
These impacts are generated by false expectations attched to science 
by the masses, and by the dominant influence of rich and powerful 
states and corporations . 2 3 
The inappropriate role of scientists as "high priests" of society, and 
of science as the only possible bearers of solid truth is slowly changing, 
as questions are raised about both assumptions by an increasingly aware 
and conscious public . The first step towards a de-mystification of "sci­
entific truth" as an unassailable absolute is a clearer understanding of 
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what it represents: it is always a partial truth about a partial object 
from a specific standpoint. Agazzi says it well: 
... la verite scientifique: .. . est toujours partielle dans len sens 
precis ou elle est toujours relative a un domain d'objet qui ne peut 
etre que tres limite, du moment qu ' il correspond necessairement a 
un decoupage du reel qui s'opere en adoptant uniquement un certain 
point de vue et en etablissant de plus des methodes standardisees 
pour faire des constations empiriques a l'interieur de ce meme point 
de vue limite. 2 4 
In turn, all partial truths of this sort do contribute to our ad­
vancement toward knowledge of the real, which is our ultimate object, 
not "absolute truth". Thus the false dichotomy between the alleged 
"fuzziness" and "inconclusiveness" of ethical and philosophical reasoning 
and the "hard facts" and supposed "truth" of science can be set aside, 
as Shrader- Frechette advocates. 
The next step then is what Laszlo terms "Science in the post-modern 
age . " The contemporary orientation to "physical science, big-science, 
and engineering-related science" are not the manifestations of immutable, 
essential properties of science as such, nor are the "internal values" of 
scientific communities (such criteria as "consistency, calculability, re­
solution of experimental puzzles, generality, simplicity" and the like), 
the only valid ones. 25 Today both prestige and funds attach to those 
fields and those methods. But the current changes in worldviews should 
bring them an improvement. Laszlo's excellent article pinpoints this de­
sirable and possible change precisely. 
If the world is viewed (as it has been, and is still regarded by some) 
as a "complex mechanism resolvable to its elementary parts," then it is 
logical to look for answers exclusively by a thorough study of these parts 
in isolation. If on the other hand the world is understood to be (an 
increasing trend, even within science itself) "more likely an evolving 
organism," then it is logical to study the whole , "for only the whole 
manifests the structures and processes which have emerged ... . " Rather 
than a linear "cause to effect structure," what is sought (and under­
stood) is a "network of causes and effects acting together within a 
structure that maintains and regenerates itself. " 26 
Under the influence of these changes in worldviews, "the preser­
vation and enhancement of the ecological, biological, social" and other 
environment would emerge as the obvious priority and human beings 
would strive to live in relatedness to the environment that sustains them. 
On the other hand, the effort to conquer and dominate nature through 
the creation of an artificial environment wi II be seen as the false goals 
that it is, incompatible with a true understanding of our reality . 
Laszlo sees this inevitable change in scientific goal, leading to a 
parallel re-assessment of technological applications, with the result that 
"inappropriate technologies" (i.e., those incompatible with this "new" 
scientific enterprise) would be proscribed by international law. " 2 7 
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Should this hopeful scenario truly unfold as Laszlo anticipates, then 
Shrader-Frechette's suggestions on technology assessments would be im­
plemented as clearly in line with the (new) prevailing ideology. Scientific 
research might then once again manifest and uncover an "is" worthy of 
grounding rather than obscuring an ecological "ought" which will be both 
sane, humane and ethically sound . 
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I SECTION 111 
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 
W. Jeffrey Burroughs, Ph . D. 
Assistant Professor of Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Clemson University 
There is no body of literature that speaks to the psychological 
evaluation of agricultural pesticides and the risks associated with them. 
There is however, a substantial, growing literature associated with the 
psychological eva luation of risks generally present in the social and 
physical environment. To illustrate the importance of perception in the 
evaluation of risk, an organizing model will first be introduced; then 
several areas where psychologists have made contributions to risk as­
sessment will be reviewed. 
Organizing Model 
The view taken in this paper is that the perception of risk is pri­
mary to understanding human response to environmental hazards. The 
perception of risk begins with data . Such data might be the result of 
technical investigations, reports in the popular media, or direct experi­
ence. In all cases the data alone do not represent an assessment of risk. 
Rather, we filter, organize, store in memory, and cognitively manipulate 
such data in constructing a subjective perception of the risk present in 
any situation. The contribution of psychology to r isk assessment centers 
around understanding the cognitive processes which serve to transform 
incoming data into risk perceptions. In the following sections we will 
consider selected research results to demonstrate the impact of psycho­
logical variables as subjective risk perceptions are constructed. 
Psychological Factors Influencing the Perception 
of Risk Attitudes 
Attitudes toward the source of a risk are important filters in the 
perception and appraisal of hazards. As an illustration, consider the 
economic importance of the source of risk to indiv iduals. Several studies 
have been conducted that manipulated attitudes toward source of a risk 
and then demonstrated that differences in risk perception were a function 
of those changed attitudes. 
When individuals were presented with information about the economic 
benefits of a new Air Force base in their town, positive attitudes toward 
the base were induced . Individuals holding these positive attitudes saw 
the risks associated with the proximity of an airport as significantly less 
than those who had not received the induction . 1 The experiment has 
also been done in reverse; individuals who have more negative attitudes 
toward an Air Force base see the dangers associated with the base as 
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greater than a neutral control group. When individuals' attitudes are 
changed, their perceptions of risk seem to change as well. 
An additional illustration of the importance of attitudes comes from 
observations of what may be termed standing positive attitudes toward 
various situations . A good example is the town of Richland, Washington. 
Richland is the site of the oldest U.S . nuclear project, the Hanford 
Atomic Works, in operation since 1945 . Residents of Richland live on the 
border of a 570-square mile nuclear park that houses 75 percent of the 
atomic waste in the United States. Yet these individuals report feeling 
very secure and safe. Richland is a single-industry town. The economic 
well-being of the individuals who work there is highly tied to the Hanford 
project. It seems likely that the evaluation of risks associated with living 
in Richland are colored by the economic ties between individuals and their 
employer. 
Athough many types of attitudes may influence our perception of 
risks, it is useful to ask who will have economically influenced positive 
attitudes toward pesticides . The economic interests of chemical compa ­
nies, farmers, and food marketers all will create positive attitudes, which 
in turn will impact on perception of pesticide risks. 
Evaluation of Subjective Likelihood 
When we assess risk, we are assessing the subjective likelihood of 
the occurrence of an .event. As a second example of the way that in­
coming information is processed to generate subjective perceptions, we 
will consider several strategies that psychologists have identified that 
are used to help make such judgments. These strategies are heuristics 
or rules of thumb that may lead to distortions in "rational" risk assess­
ment . One such heuristic has been termed representativeness . 2 We 
desire certainty and confidence in our judgments that can lead to biases. 
The pressure to reduce uncertainty and arrive at decisions may 
cause individuals to overestimate the reliability of data from small sam­
ples . A small amount of data is thus seen as overly representative of a 
certain situation. We may pay attention to the results of a few cases in 
our experience and overgeneralize to all cases--often ignoring statistical 
evidence. Consider farmers who have used the pesticide Temik for years 
without problems. In evaluating risks associated with this pesticide, 
these individuals may overgeneralize from their own experience and not 
appreciate the hazards that statistical information indicates is present 
with this compound . 
A second important heuristic used in making estimates of subjective 
likelihood has been termed availability . 3 We generally believe an event 
is more likely to occur if we can recall or imagine vivid instances of it . 
According to the availability heuristic, we search our memories for spe­
cific instances of events when we estimate how likely they are. If it is 
easy to retrieve instances, we judge the event as likely--if it is difficult, 
we judge the event as less likely . This typically works well, but the 
likelihood of highly vivid, rare events tends to be overestimated whereas 
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bland, common events tend to be underestimated. Applied to pesticides, 
availability could function to cause us either to overestimate or under­
estimate the likelihood of hazards. A vivid event such as last year's 
highly publicized watermelon poisonings increases the perception of risk 
inordinately. In contrast, mundane day-to-day experience with chemicals 
on fruits and vegetables evokes risk perceptions that may be artificially 
low because consequences are typically not dramatic or even apparent. 
Our perceptions of risk are thus influenced by the way that incoming 
information is processed. 
Perceived Control 
A third way that psychological processes may influence the percep­
tion of risk is through feelings of control that individuals possess. In 
general, the greater the perceptions of control in a risk situation, the 
less risk we will perceive. 4 Natural disasters, most types of illnesses, 
high technology systems and pesticide use are all examples of situations 
not typically under an individual's personal control. As a result of this 
lack of control, risk perceptions will increase. One way of increasing 
feelings of control is through knowledge. 5 If individuals understand 
principles of operation, personal control feelings are enhanced. Indi­
viduals directly associated with pesticides and therefore knowledgeable 
about their uses may perceive the risks associated with these compounds 
differently from those who are not. Further, it suggests that one way 
of decreasing undue fear of pesticide use is by education and the in­
creases in perceived control that such knowledge might provide. 
Presentation Format of Information 
Finally, the way information is presented to us will influence our 
evaluation of risks. As an illustration, pretend one has lung cancer and 
must decide between surgery and radiation treatment. Ten out of 100 
individuals die during surgery and 66 of 100 individuals who choose 
surgery die within five years. In contrast, among those who receive 
radiation therapy, no one dies du ring treatment , but 78 out of 100 die 
within five years. Which does one choose? Now suppose additional in­
formation becomes available which indicates that the life expectancy of 
surgery survivors is 6.8 years while the life expectancy after radiation 
treatment is 4. 7 years. Would one change his or her mind? When McNeil 
and her associates' asked a group of radiologists, graduate students, 
and patients the same questions, 56 percent initially chose surgery. 
After being presented with life expectancy information in years, the 
percent choosing surgery rose to 75 percent. The notable fact is that 
the information describing number of deaths out of 100 and the informa­
tion describing average life expectancy is based on the same data and 
are simply alternative presentation formats. As the increase in the 
number of subjects choosing surgery shows, different presentation for­
mats lead to different evaluations of risk. It is important to realize that 
there are no neutral ways to present information. Different statistical 
presentations will be perceived different ways and will lead to different 
risk perceptions. These facts again point to the importance of realizing 
that risk perceptions are actively constructed from available information. 
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Discussion 
Any assessment of risk must be based on some type of data . De­
pending on the training and methodology available to an individual , these 
data may take many forms . A biologist , for example , might consider 
mortality rates attributable to carcinogens at var ious dosage levels , but 
a sociologist might correlate measures of social structure with indices of 
social distress . Of equal importance , indiv iduals without techn ical 
t r aining also evaluate hazards present in their envi ronments . Such as ­
sessments may be based on information gained through conversations with 
others or through popular media. Finally, policy makers may use a wide 
variety of technical and popularly reported data in risk - related decision 
making and public policy development. 
The data presented in this paper suggest that individuals in all 
cases, whether they are technically trained or not, will process risk data 
they have into subjective perceptions of the risk in given situations. 
Even in cases where "objective" data are present, those results must be 
interpreted so that some subjective estimate of the amount of risk in that 
situation is constructed . Such objective data may be extremely valuab le , 
but all data must be interpreted to be useful . Whether the goal of ri sk 
assessment is scientific decision making, personal evaluation of danger, 
or the establishment of public policy, incoming data must be processed 
into meaningful evaluations. Analyses of perceptions of risk are therefore 
c ri t ical to an overall understanding of risk assessment . 
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SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
Brenda J. Vander Mey, Ph . D. 
Assistant Professor of Sociology 
Dep,artment of Sociology 
Clemson University 
When asked to make a public presentation on sociological aspects of 
environmental risk assessment, my initial response was, "Well, what do 
you want me to cover?" One might well assume that my request stemmed 
from ignorance. Actually, the concern was with the broad and encom­
passing nature of the task. We sociologists, social scientists who study 
human behavior using the group as the basic unit of analysis, focus not 
only on social environments but also on the symbiotic relationship between 
social and physical environments. As stated by Paul Ehrlich 1 " .•. social 
systems all operate in an ecological context and interact with the envi­
ronmental setting in which society finds itself" (p. 9). Thus, a topic 
such as environmental risk assessment places a heavy burden on sociol­
ogists. We must first ask and then attempt to answer such questions 
as: "Who is at risk? What is at risk? What socio-historical factors 
promoted this risk? What prevailing ideologies are correlated with per­
ceptions of the physical environment vis-a-vis humanity's use of it? What 
group membership, lifestyle, and values variables are correlated with the 
use and abuse of and concern for the physical environment? Finally, 
should sociologists stay on their own "turf" when addressing environ­
mental issues?" 
Admittedly, this conference is focusing on the use of pesticides and 
environmental risk. Beyond a doubt, however, pesticide use falls under 
the purview of the broader and more global umbrella of environmental, 
ecological issues. Thus, I will speak to the issues of pesticide use and 
the aforementioned questions in this context. 
The Ecological Crisis 
In this nation and throughout the world, the physical environment 
has been used, abused, and exploited such that we now face an ecological 
crisis. 2 As early as 1285, London suffered smog problems because of 
the heavy · reliance on soft coal for fuel, 3 and certain animals became 
extinct in Europe by the seventeenth century as a result of uncontrolled 
hunting and trapping. 4 
Today, we find research and essays on air pollution - types, 
sources, and effects on human life and climate, 5 water pollution, water 
quality, use and allocation, 6 soil erosion and soil alteration, 7 energy, 8 
deforestation, forest use and effects of pollution on forests, 9 , and the 
use and effects of pesticides on the environment, humans, and 
animals. 10 
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A mere cursory perusal of literature on the state of the physical 
environment leads one to conclude that not only is the physical environ­
ment at risk but also everything in it -- animals, humans, plants. Ev­
erything has been placed at risk. The risk being run is that of 
rendering the physical environment useless and unsafe; depleting natural 
resources; polluting the air, water, and soil; losing arable land; and 
poisoning or killing all creatures dependent upon the earth for mere 
survival. 
From a sociologist's point of view, then, it becomes imperative to 
ask what factors or social forces facilitated this ecological crisis and what 
factors or forces play a part in "fixing" the crisis . Further, we must 
ask ourselves which variables are associated with resistance to environ­
mentally sound practices and why. The remainder of this paper is ded­
icated to this pursuit. 
Socio-Historical Aspects of Environmental Perception 
and use in the United States 
As Riley E. Dunlap and Kent D. Van Liere have noted, writers 
frequently contend that "our nation's ecological problems stem in large 
part from the traditional values, attitudes, and beliefs prevalent within 
our society." 11 These include a capitalistic orientation toward work and 
environment, a religious ideology promoting both capitalism and control 
over the environment, and a laissez-faire political orientation endorsing 
free enterprise with little regulation from official bodies of government. 
Hans Huth's extensive volume on the interface between Americans' per­
ceptions of the environment and use of it found that in the course of 
three centuries we have moved from viewing our natural resources as 
inexhaustible and "there for the taking," to revelling in the beauty of 
our land, to, in the Roosevelt era, focusing on conservation. Huth's 
book ends after a description of the buildup of cities and highways 
through the middle of the twentieth century . At the end of his book, 
however, it should be noted that Huth stresses the need for the devel­
opment of an "ecological conscience" 12 -- beseeching the American, in 
the words of Aldo Leopold, to "change his role as a conqueror to that 
of a citizen of the biotic community." 1 3 
James McEvoy argues that it is difficult to provide a totally reliable 
account of the history of Americans' perceptions and uses of the envi­
ronment since much of the available written evidence is prosaic and 
anecdotal. 14 However, as indicated in the reference made to Huth's 15 
work, attempts have been made to organize that which is available toward 
such an end. 
Evidence indicates that the early colonists were awed by the natural 
abundance omnipresent in the new land . Interspersed with this awe was 
fear 16 -- fear of the diverse and seemingly hostile ecosystems and their 
elements, and fear of what seemed uncontrollable and control Iing. The 
response to this fear and awe was couched in religious precepts 
taking dominion over the environment. White 17 argues that "Christianity 
... not only established a dualism over man and nature but also insisted 
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that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends. "* 18 
Although the Genesis passage states that humans have 
the duty to take dominion over animals and to subdue the earth, the 
colonists, strongly influenced by Calvin, interpreted the creation story 
to mean that unbridled use of the earth was expected. Their fear of 
the wild nature of their new world furthered their dedication to 
dominion. 19 
William Burch's 20 Daydreams and Nightmares : A Sociological Essay 
on the American Environment reveals that this awe over abundance and 
the dedication to dominion merged with carelessness among the colonists 
regarding the environment for at least five reasons (based on a study 
done by J. Boorstin and reported by Burch). These reasons were: little 
production for a cash market; the need to waste land since land was in 
abundance and labor ,was scarce; experimentation with the unfamiliar 
land, causing environmental destruction; ignorance of proper farming 
techniques; and random development of a system of farming methods. 21 
The frontier era served to advance the stage set by the colonists. 
Once again, in the face of untamed wildernesses and abundant land and 
fueled by the spirit of individualism, Americans set forth to control the 
environment, to literally conquer new lands. Land and nature were to 
be used as people saw fit. Land ownership was seen as the great 
equalizer. Frontier values and perception related to the use of the land, 
as indicated by Burch 22 -- based on a Congressional study conducted 
during the Dust Bowl era) included: 
Man conquers nature; natural resources are inexhaustible; habitual 
practices are better; what is good for the individual is good for 
everybody (note: confer, Huth, 1957, p. 210); an owner may do 
with his property as he likes; expanding markets will continue in­
definitely; free competition coordinates industry and agriculture; 
property values will increase indefinitely; the factory farm is gen­
erally desirable; and, the individual must make his own 
adjustments. 2 3 
As noted by Lewis Moncreif, people on the frontier usually did not 
see natural resources as valuable. Rather, natural resources were ob­
stacles. Forests were clearcut to allow for farming. Marshes and sod 
were considered useless and "obnoxious." It would not be until 1890, 
when the frontier had almost been completely settled, that people began 
*As a note, I think it worthy to indicate that , although several au­
thors (White, 1971; 2 Barr, 1974; 19 McEvoy, 1972 14 ) stress the im­
portance of the creation story in Genesis and t he colonists' Calvinistic 
leanings as instrumental in the colonists' exploitation of the envi­
ronment, I have as yet to see references to Leviticus 19:9, 19:10, 
19:19, and 19:23-25 wherein we find parameters placed on the 
breeding of cattle, sowing of seeds, and harvesting of crops. 
(Further, for an argument regarding the misinterpretation of the 
words "dominion" and "subdue," and, hence, a misinterpretation of 
the creation story, see Barr, 1974. 19 ) 
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to re-think at least one tenet of the frontier era: resources, indeed, 
were exhaustible . 24 
During the Roosevelt era, at a time when industrialization, mecha ­
nization, and urbanization were becoming facts of and forces in the lives 
of · all Americans, a notable concern emerged for conservation . The 
government began to alter its view of natural resource management . The 
in itial concern was over forest preservation . 25 Since then , we have seen 
the emergence of the National Parks Service, the Soil Conservation So­
ciety of America, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth , the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, and the Environmental Protection Agency. In addition, 
we have witnessed the passage of environmental protection and environ­
mental reform legislation such as the National Environmental Protection 
Act of 1969 . All of these things, at least in part, stem from the horrible 
realization that not only natural resources are exhaustible, but also that 
abuse of our environment carries potentially grave consequences. 
McEvoy 26 notes, however, that there has not been a consistent 
concern over the environment and that the two world wars created cir­
cumstances conducive to deflecting public interest in environmental is­
sues . When the environmental movement re - emerged in the late 1960s, 
it initially was a youth movement and an upper-middle-class 
movement. 2 7 
Moncreif argues that the present state of environmental concern and 
the ecological crisis itself are both evidence of "what happens when de­
mocracy , technology, urbanization, capitalistic mission, and antagonism 
(or apathy) toward natural environments are blended together. " 28 Ac­
cordingly, today we find ourselves concerned with the management of our 
ecological crisis . This concern over environmental risk is not universal, 
to say the least. Now I would like to turn attention to the variables, 
forces , and factors that contemporary sociologists explore vis - a-vis en­
vironmental risk . Keeping in mind the symbiotic natu r e of human and 
social environments , it is hoped that we may begin to appreciate not only 
th is symbiosis but also the complexity of environmental risk assessment. 
Sociological Aspects of Environmental Risk 
The Role of Values and Lifestyles 
In the preceding discussion on socio - historical aspects of the per­
ception and use of the environment, values (estimations of good and bad , 
right and wrong) are pivotal elements in the symbiotic relat ionship be­
tween social and environmental issues . Buttel and Flinn indicate that two 
distinct dimensions of rural values -- agrarianism and ruralism - - are 
differentially associated with environmental concern . Ru ralism finds its 
roots in the nostalgic, perhaps imagined, folk cul tu re of rural dwellers. 
Values endorsed include "independence, self-sufficiency , and family 
farming . 1129 Agrarianism embodies a utilitarian (i . e ., exploitative, eco­
nomic) orientation toward the natural environment. Ru ralism, urban in 
nature, focuses on the environment (rural life) as "a point of equilibrium 
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between the wilderness and urban civi Iization. " 3 0 Genteel country life 
and the exultation and preservation of nature and natural beauty are 
v·al'ues associated with ruralism. Buttel and Flinn's research indicates 
that rural ism is more strongly associated with environmental concern than 
is agrarianism, though membership in the upper-middle class was more 
significant than either orientation. 
It has been argued that pro-environmentalism was borne of urban 
dwellers with anti-urban leanings. 3 1 Perhaps Irv ing Horowitz's statement 
is appropriate at this point: 
... it is my belief that the ecology movement is basically a product 
of traditional social sentiments that lurk deeply in the minds of many 
Americans -- especially those who still harbor faith in rural - ideals 
and troglodytic values. Indeed, it is probable that these rural ideals 
a re more firmly and fervently held by those who have never been 
on a farm and never encountered an honest- t o-goodness farmer. 32 
Lowe and Pin hey, 3 3 acknowledging that socia l science research tends 
to support the thesis that rural people show lower levels of support for 
environmental protection than do urban dwellers , tested the hypothesis 
that this less supportive inclination was in part due to the rural dwellers' 
utilitarian orientation toward the environment. There did appear to be 
a weak but significant relationship between agricultural occupation and 
decreased concern for the environment environment. Moreover, research 
by Buttel and Flinn 3 4 reinforces this contention and suggests that per­
sons living in densely populated areas feel more environmental problems 
and thus are more environmentally concerned. However, it should be 
noted that, although regional differences in environmental concern were 
minimal, Lowe, Pinhey, and Grimes 135 analysis of the 1973-1978 General 
Social Survey data revealed that rural residents living in areas that had 
experienced environmental problems scored highe r on environmental con­
cern than did residents in rather trouble-free met ropolitan areas. Thus, 
residence alone may not be predictive of environmental concern or tend­
ency to support environmental reform measures. 
In addition to rural-urban differences, differences by social class 
may also have bearing on environmental risk. A study of 548 Wisconsin 
residents 18 years of age or older revealed tha t income did not appear 
to be a significant factor but that education did. 36 Not only did better 
educated people evidence greater awareness of environmental problems 
but they also were more supportive of environmental reform. Similar 
results were found in Dunlap and Van Liere's 37 two sample (N=l441; 
N=558) study comparing Washington state reside nts (first sample) with 
the general public (second-sample). The relationship between education, 
environmental concern, and support for environmental reform may be a 
function of greater exposure to the issues. Whatever the reason, the 
upper-middle-class seem to be the most concerned about the 
environment. 38 
Differences by political orientation and ownership-nonownership of 
land also have bearing on environmental risk research. As might be 
expected, persons more "liber·al" in political orientation are more inclined 
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toward a global appreciation of environmental risk and needs for reform 
than their more conservative counterparts. 39 More specifically, liberals 
and Democrats tend to score higher on environmental concern measures 
than do conservatives and Republicans. 40 Welfare-state liberals (those 
concerned with the disadvantaged and inequality) and anti-laissez-faire 
liberals (who contend that the state should intervene for the collective 
good) appear most supportive of environmer:ital reform yet divided among 
themselves regarding the government's role . 41 
Although it is sometimes fruitless to label people either "liberal" or 
"conservative" since these exist on a continuum and can even be issue ­
specific, it does appear that the more "pro-business" Republican orien­
tation facilitates the resistance to environmental measures threatening to 
the corporate elite. 42 Overall, "liberalism" appears related to education, 
a variable previously discussed. 
John Pierce's 43 study of 687 Washington state residents' values 
orientation and support for water resource preservation revealed that, 
not surprisingly, property owners were more supportive than non­
property owners. The most supportive group was property owners with 
waterfront properties . Thus, all political orientation and social class 
variables aside, personal, individual reasons may prompt or deter one's 
stance vis-a-vis environmental issues in general or specific environmental 
issues of local importance. 
Those most in favor of pesticides and their use appear to be farm­
ers . They tend to perceive a real need for pesticides in their 
industry. 44 Again, we see the importance of assessing environmental 
issues on the basis of one's relationship to the general environment or 
to certain environments or environmental practices. That is, one's own 
involvement with the environment must be considered. A utilitarian re­
lationship with the environment (e.g., the farmers with their pesticides; 
the waterfront property owners with their water) significantly shapes 
one's assessment of risk and willingness or reluctance to support envi­
ronmental reform. 
The single most important predictor of perception of environmental 
risk and support for environmental reform is age . 45 Young people ages 
18-25 show the greatest degree of environmental concern and support for 
environmental reform. 46 Buttel and Flinn contend that 
pro-environmentalism d9vetails with the historically low commitment 
of youth to the dominant va I ue system du ring the past decade ... the 
strong generational cast to pres ent patterns of environmental beliefs 
is due, in part, to the radicalization of youth during the 
1960s, .. . along with possible ' sublimation' of this radicalization into 
reformist movement issues such as environmentalism . 4 7 
Certainly, age and generation are important variables. 48 Further, given 
that public support for environmental reform is relatively high, it appears 
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that age, although remaining a factor, will soon incorporate more age 
groups as cohorts begin to age. 
Economics vs. the Environment: The Crux of the Matter? 
As previously alluded to several times, prevailing ideology and use 
of the environment are crucial variables to study in risk assessment. 
The colonists and pioneers, influenced by Calvinism, the Protestant 
Ethic, and their perception of abundance, have left a legacy with which 
to this very day we must contend. Our faith in technology and science 
prompted the use and incorporation of agricultural and industrial prac­
tices and chemicals, which, in turn, contributed heavily to our current 
ecological crisis. Although as a nation we have begun to come to grips 
with the crisis, and its ancestors, one force still holds sway. That force 
is economics. 
Warren A. Johnson and John Hardesty note: ~,, ... our economic 
system maximizes output... while our ecology calls for balanced 
throughput, for limiting the consumption of resources to conserve the 
materials on which the functioning of the ecosystem depends and to avoid 
contaminating the ecosystem with an excess of waste. "4 9 
The economic issue is one which must be broached on a national as 
well as an individual level. Does "big business" own our air and water? 
In whose best interest is it for farmers to use hazardous pesticides to 
increase yield and profit? In what ways should land be used? How do 
we bridge the gap between the economic and ecological realms? Is eco­
nomics the crux of the matter? 
Farmers, utilitarian for the most part in their orientation to their 
industry, do that which appears to be the most efficient and profitable 
-- as do other industrialists. When pesticides (specifically, DDT) were 
introduced on a large scale in 1945, they were seen as the answer to 
many farmers' problems. With the pest populations controlled or exter­
minated completely, larger and more profitable harvests were assured. 
In the early 1960s, researchers began warning of the harmful environ­
mental effects of pesticides. 5 0 Organic farming has been offered as a 
solution. Though viewed as impractical by farmers (especially by those 
with large operations), when energy savings are taken into account, at 
least one study indicates that profit margins are roughly the same. 51 
Integrated Pest Management (1PM) -- crop rotation; use of resistant 
plants, use of hormones and pheromones; selective use of pesticides, etc. 
-- has been offered as a second alternative. While IPM holds great 
promise, farmers, fearful of economic loss du ring the transition period, 
are reluctant to alter their practices. In addition, since the goal of 1PM 
is to keep pests at a level just below potential injury to crops, farmers, 
influenced by pesticide manufacturers, do not perceive IPM to be a viable 
solution or alternative. 52 
In their study of 340 Illinois farmers, Pampel and van Es found that 
practices profitable to farmers commercially were related to innovation 
and adaptation while farmers' environmental adaptations were not. Ac-
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tually, the research indicated that the adoption of commercial innovations 
is independent of the adoption of environmental innovation. Farm capital, 
acres farmed, fa rm sales and farmers' education were significantly related 
to the adaptation of commercial practices . For these same variables, only 
farm capital bore a significant relationship to the adaptation of environ­
mental practices. 5 3 
Buttel and Flinn 54 found a weak relationship between attitudes to­
ward economic growth and environmental control . They caution, how­
ever, that forced compliance with environmental reform will, in all 
likelihood, be unsuccessful. Even voluntary compliance must be very 
gingerly promoted . 
Economic orientation, in itself, represents a value orientation. En­
vironmental improvement poses itself as a direct threat to economic 
expansionists. 5 5 
Similar dilemmas are found when one focuses on land-use planning. 
Our soil is precious and exhaustible. Current est imates are that 2 billion 
tons of soil are deposited into water systems every year. Some areas 
of the Midwest now retain less than six inches of topsoil. And, though 
large-scale conservation began in the 1930s, we now find that irrigation 
and sewer systems, as well as other development imperatives, are 
usurping soil conservation areas and efforts. 56 As the U. S. continues 
to urbanize and residential sprawl creeps out into exurbia and rural 
areas, about 1 million additional tons of prime farm land are taken over 
each year . 57 In this country, land has been used on a best-fit basis. 
Until very recently, only an economic value was usually applied to land. 
Today, groups are emerging who view land as a natural and precious 
resource. Though speaking only to land use, Gunnar C . lsberg's 
statement that certain land use trends in the United States suggest that 
we are reaching a profound period in history in which choices related 
to land use may have a profound effect upon future generations. Making 
these decisions may necessitate that we alter our view of environmentally 
sensitive lands from an economic perspective to one that recognizes the 
intrinsic value of these lands to society, which is to be held in trust for 
existing and future generations, 58 is a statement actually pertaining to 
the entire ecological crisis and our necessary responses to it. 
Conclusion and Final Note 
Conclusion 
This paper provides a cursory overview of the nature and extent 
of our current ecological crisis. It is noted that values and prevailing 
ideologies, especially the Calvinists' devotion to dominion and the pio­
neers' rugged individualism, not only shaped Americans' perceptions of 
our relationship to and proper use of the environment but also facilitated 
circumstances conducive to our current ecological crisis. Sociological 
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factors investigated in environmental risk research include: the role of 
values and lifestyles; rural-urban residence; social class; political ori­
entation; and age. Younger, urban, upper-middle-class and politically 
liberal people evidence more concern for the environment and more sup­
port for environmental reform. Farmers and those others who have a 
utilitarian emphasis tend to evaluate the environment in economic and 
use-value terms. It appears that, if we are to manage our ecological 
crisis, a shift in perceptions of the value of our environment is imper­
ative. 
Final Note 
Although this paper is more general in scope rather than being 
purely sociological, it was felt that, given the symbiotic relationship be­
tween social and natural environments, it should necessarily be so. Paul 
R. Ehrlich 59 has argued for a teamwork approach -- a multi-disciplinary 
approach -- to environmental issues. Oscar S. Gray 6 0 , in his keynote 
address at the Conference on Application of Behavioral Sciences to En­
vironmental Design, bemoaned the fragmentation by academic discipline 
when dealing with a topic that essentially has no boundaries. The need, 
as so simply yet eloquently stated by Calvin W. Taylor, 61 , is "for the 
pertinent professions and sciences to function together, especially to be 
of greatest service to the public." Whether speaking to environmental 
design for purely aesthetic purposes, or focusing on environmental risk 
and reform for survival purposes, we are well advised to forget the "turf" 
of our (erroneously) presumed pristine disciplines and work together, 
doing our part in the management of our shared ecological crisis. 
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